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‘Achieving good governance and overcoming the practices of profligacy and corruption 
inherited from the apartheid government and its economy are the two most important 
challenges facing South Africa. Corruption has burgeoned in both the public and private 
sector since the transition and is the factor which most preoccupies those who express 
concerns about South Africa’s future.’1
 
I. Introduction 
The crime of corruption has plagued human societies since the earliest forms of social order 
evolved. The fact that even the Code of Hammurabi (2100 BC) and the Bible refer to this 
phenomenon (Deuteronomy 10:17; 16:19) 2 and that already the Roman Consul Krassus had 
corrupted the Roman building industry3 shows that this crime can truly be described as the 
second oldest business of the world. 
 
Although corruption is thus indeed not a new phenomenon, national governments, non-
government-organisations, the mass media, citizens and the United Nations have turned their 
attention only in recent years to this problem. Induced by a huge number of recently 
emerged corruption-scandals worldwide,4 public awareness has increased that corruption is 
not a rare crime committed by a few ‘black sheep’, but on the contrary, an almost ubiquitous 
and far more widespread threat for any society than it was assumed in the past. The German 
prosecutor Schaupensteiner states in this regard: ‘Wherever you look for corruption, you 
will find it’5. However, conducting empirical research on the topic of corruption is 
extremely difficult and profound knowledge of the extent of corruption is still very limited 




1 Lala Camerer (ed) Costly Crimes: Commercial Crime and Corruption in South Africa, (ISS Monograph, 
1997) 31, 38. 
2 Jonathan Burchell and John Milton Principles of Criminal Law, 3ed (Cape Town: Juta, 2005) 890. 
3 Renate Verjahns ‘Bestechungsdelikte’ available at http://www.strafrecht.de/de/bereiche/ 
bestechungsdelikte.php (accessed 14.8.2005). 
4 See for a worldwide overview Transparency International ‘Global Corruption Report 2005’ available at 
www.globalcorruptionreport.org (accessed 14.8.2005). 
5 See Wolfgang Schaupensteiner ‘Korruption in Deutschland – Das Ende der Tabuisierung’ in Mark Pieth and 
Peter Eigen (eds) Korruption im internationalen Geschäftsverkehr (Neuwied and Kriftel, 1999) 131 at 131. 
6 An empiric survey of corruption in South Africa is from Transparency International ‘Country Study Report 
2005, Final Draft’ available at http://www.transparency.org/activities/nat_integ_systems/dnld/ 
draft_s_africa_18.03.05.pdf (accessed 14.8.2005). A detailed empiric study of corruption in Germany is from 
Britta Bannenberg Korruption und ihre strafrechtliche Kontrolle. Eine kriminologisch-strafrechtliche Analyse 
(BKA-Forschungsreihe: Neuwied, Kriftel, 2002). 
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This state of affairs has furthermore promoted the insight that the causes for the large extent 
of corruption are less likely a mere misconduct by individuals, but a structural failure of the 
law, the prosecution authorities, the control mechanisms of civil society and a lack of 
properly implemented corporate governance. Although these findings might first of all be 
startling, they provide at the same time an effective remedy, because these structural 
conditions can be changed by politics and the civil society in order to reduce the spread of 
corruption. The reason why the spread of corrupt activities depends to a larger extent on 
external, social conditions – most of all the risk of detection – than for instance the amount 
of violent crimes is that these offences are often committed with the purpose of economic 
profit, e.g. to obtain a contract or a permission. The perpetrators therefore rationally balance 
the assumed profit with the risk and the consequences of their possible detection and thus 
can be influenced in their decisions by the criminal law. 
 
The realisation of the so far underestimated spread and harm of corruption as well as the 
need for structural changes have induced countries all over the world as well as the United 
Nations in recent years to take various measures, particularly in the field of criminal law 
against corruption.7 While, for instance, Germany has passed the 
Korruptionsbekämpfungsgesetz (Combating Corruption Act) in 1997, South Africa has 
implemented the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act No. 12 of 20048 on 
27 April 2004, which repealed the Corruption Act 94 of 1992. This Act contains a number 
of ‘unbundled’9 offences in respect of various corrupt activities and its volume indicates that 
it might at the same time extend the scope of the criminal liability. As additional measures 
the Act orders the establishment of a Register for Tender Defaulters and imposes a duty to 
report corrupt transactions on certain persons with authority in entities of the public or 
private sector. Furthermore, it contains a presumption in respect of the link between the 
bribe and the corruptly influenced decision and grants the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions to investigate an individual, if he or she possesses ‘unexplained wealth’ that 
might be the result of corrupt activities. 
 
The PCCAA deserves mainly for three reasons a detailed evaluation, which will be the topic 
of the present dissertation. Firstly, the serious threat of corruption requires effective legal 
countermeasures and thus the efficiency of the PCCAA is of great importance for the fight 
 
7 See eg the United Nations Convention against corruption adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on 31 October 2003. 
8 Following abbreviated as PCCAA. 
9 For an explanation of this legislative technique see the Preamble of the PCCAA and below pp 37 ff. 
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against corruption in South Africa. Secondly, the PCCAA is a ‘drastic and draconic 
deviation from the status quo’10 and as its offences relate to almost any sphere of live, the 
exact scope of the criminal liability imposed by the Act is of great importance for any 
citizen of South Africa. The offences of the PCCAA therefore deserve careful evaluation, 
particularly whether they cover unintentionally legitimate, non-corrupt conduct. Finally, a 
comprehensive evaluation of the PCCAA is called for, because the amount of literature and 
comments on this rather new piece of legislation is still rather small. 
 
In order to serve this purpose, first of all an in-depth analysis of the actual phenomenon of 
corruption and its universal structure without regard to the positive law is required upfront. 
As corruption is a much more complex and amorphous crime than for instance murder, 
robbery or theft, the efficiency of legislative measures against corruption can thus only be 
evaluated properly, if one has defined this phenomenon precisely at first. One German 
scholar has pointed out with regard to this general problem: ‘The legislature needs to know 
the reality; otherwise it could neither determine how it should be, nor judge whether it can 
indeed be changed in accordance with its objective.’11 Another scholar stressed with specific 
reference to the fight against corruption, that ‘reasonable and long-sighted criminal policy 
needs a definition of the nature of corruption and its main elements as its yardstick’.12 In a 
similar manner, the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy of South Africa emphasises that 
‘in order to develop a Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy it is important to understand 
the various forms in which corruption manifests itself […]’.13
 
Consequently, the present dissertation will firstly focus on analysing the universal structure 
and essential elements of the actual phenomenon of corruption (II.). On this basis it will 
following be examined, which specific problems arise from this structure in respect of 
legislation that aims at combating corruption (III.). Against this background the PCCAA 
will then be evaluated and commented (IV.). For this purpose also the offences against 
corruption as stipulated by the German Strafgesetzbuch (Penal code)14 will be taken into a 
comparative consideration. 
 
10 D Lambrechts ‘The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act as an investigative instrument 
pertaining to bribery and corruption’ (2004) 17 Acta Criminologica 106 at 117. 
11 Ernst von Beling Methodik der Gesetzgebung, insbesondere der Strafgesetzgebung. Zugleich ein Beitrag zur 
Würdigung des Strafgesetzbuchentwurfs von 1919 (Berlin, 1922) 1. 
12 Klaus Volk ‘Die Merkmale der Korruption und die Fehler bei ihrer Bekämpfung’ in Karl Heinz Gössel and 
Otto Triffterer (eds) Gedächtnisschrift für Heinz Zipf (Heidelberg, 1999) 419 at 419. 
13 Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy (Department of Public Service and Administration, January 2002) 7. 
14 Following referred to as StGB. 
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II. An analysis of the actual structure of corruption 
As aforementioned, any evaluation of legislative measures against corruption requires a 
clear idea of the phenomenon of corruption as its target upfront. This is the more important, 
because also in science there exists no common definition of corruption at present, but there 
are various approaches from a legal, economic, philosophical and sociological point of 
view.15 Besides, the phenomenon of corruption is indeed a very widespread, heterogeneous 
and amorphous topic and its Latin origin ‘corrumpere’, which means ‘to break’ or ‘to break 
down’, does not really give an answer to the question, what corruption actually is. In a 
similar manner Professor Snyman has pointed out that it does not help much for the 
understanding of the phenomenon of corruption but instead brings one to the nebulous zone 
of morality, if one tries to trace the meaning of the word ‘corrupt’ in dictionaries, as a court 
once did and ascertained that it means, inter alia, ‘sleg, bedorwe…rotten, depraved, wicked, 
... [and] moral deterioration’.16
 
Furthermore, different people will have distinct approaches to define corruption, particularly 
as in the reporting of the mass media very often also quite unlike crimes like breach of trust, 
embezzlement, fraud and sometimes even any abuse of power – especially if committed by 
mighty people like for instance dictators – are named as ‘corruption’. To put it another way: 
‘Understanding the dimensions of corruption entails also understanding what corruption is 
not. Corruption is often described interchangeably with maladministration, incapacity and 
inefficiency, especially because public resources are being used. The deficiency of 
approaching corruption in this manner is that corruption becomes indefinable and thus 
impossible to address. Though corruption seems easily identifiable, it is of paramount 
importance to establish a workable legal definition of corruption, in order to maximise 
preventative and combating efforts […].’17
 
In order to find a sharp-edged definition of corruption it is in my opinion inevitable and 
quite useful to examine the basic elements of any form of corruption. To serve this purpose, 
first some examples of corruption in various spheres of live will be illustrated briefly (1.) 
and, following, it will be analysed, which essential, common elements can be abstracted 
from these cases (2.). 
 
15 An overview of various definitions gives Constanze Bauer ‘Administrative Corruption in Central 
Government’ Paper presented at the International CRIMSA/IASA Conference Crime and Justice in the 
Nineties (University of South Africa 3-5 July 1996) at 2 f. 
16 CR Snyman Criminal Law 4ed (Durban: Butterworths, 2002) 381. 
17 Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy (note 13) 8. 
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1. Examples for corruption in various spheres of life 
Corruption exists within any sphere of live in modern states, economies and societies and 
the following examples refer to these main spheres in the public as well as the private sector. 
a) Corruption within the public sector 
Corruption within the public sector is often regarded as the ‘classic’ form of corruption and 
the predominant part of attention of the media is directed to report this kind of corruption. 
aa) Corruption within the executive 
Corruption within the executive ranges from a low-profile-level, where public officials in 
the administration are bribed by ordinary citizens with comparatively small amounts of 
money to high-profile-cases where members of the government are bribed by worldwide 
operating concerns with millions of rands. 
 
Corruption within the administration is widespread and in the majority of the cases the bribe 
payer acts to gain a material advantage, eg any kinds of permissions, like building permits, 
driving licences18, permissions for the erection of plants as well as licences to exploit 
mineral resources. There are also media reports about bribes being paid to Roadworthy 
Inspectors in South Africa’s Roadworthy Test Centres by drivers to obtain the Roadworthy 
Certificate for non-roadworthy cars.19 In this particular case even the anti-corruption unit 
that was subsequently mandated by the Gauteng traffic inspectorate to investigate 
allegations against the alleged corrupt inspectors was suspected to be taking bribes from 
them in exchange for turning a blind eye on their corrupt behaviour. Another purpose of 
bribing administration employees can be the avoidance of various disadvantages as in the 
case of bribes being paid by drunken drivers to police officers in order to circumvent fines. 
 
On a high-profile-level, corruption concerns predominantly government-decisions on a 
national or provincial level regarding the allocation of contracts, like arms or other military 
products and all kinds of infrastructural projects. Especially major projects like waste 
disposal or purification plants, airports and big dams are very often affected by corruption 
and many realised projects later turned out as outsized or even completely useless judged 
from an objective, economical perspective. One such example in southern Africa is the 3.7 
billion $ Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which was designed to transfer water from the 
 
18 See for a real case in South Africa in this regard Gill Gifford ‘Anti-corruption unit busted’ The Star 30 July 
2004 at 1. 
19 Ibid. 
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Maluti Mountains to Gauteng, through a network of dams.20 Several construction and 
engineering companies from all over the world have been found guilty of bribing the 
project’s chief and other officials in order to obtain and inflate contracts. Another example 
for alleged high-profile-corruption within the government is the so-called ‘arms-deal’ in 
South Africa. In this scandal the financial adviser of the Vice-President was convicted for 
having a generally corrupt relationship with the latter and suspected of having solicited a 
bribe from European arms manufacturers in respect of the allocation of a multi-billion-rand 
arms procurement contract.21
bb) Corruption within the legislative 
As legislative decisions often affect the commercial interests of various parties and as the 
way in which a certain decision is made can be of great material value, such decisions are 
likely to be influenced by bribes given to members of parliament or political parties. This is 
often done by professional lobbyists, who try to influence laws on behalf of big companies, 
like e.g. the pharmaceutical industry, which often attempts to avoid or manipulate reforms in 
the health sector that threaten to cut their profits. An actual case of bribery within the 
legislative happened in Germany in the 1980´s, when the German entrepreneur Flick bribed 
politicians and political parties in order to induce a tax law, the later so-called ‘lex Flick’, 
which was supposed to allow him the sale of his enterprise without paying the usual amount 
of taxes. In South Africa the so-called ‘travelscam’ emerged recently, where a number of 
Members of Parliament defrauded the parliamentary travel-budget of several millions of 
rand through collusion with travel agents.22
cc) Corruption within the judiciary 
Corruption also occurs within the judiciary, for instance, a party in a civil law suit might try 
to influence the outcome of the case by bribing the judge or an accused might try to bribe 
the judge in order to avoid a conviction or at least mitigate the punishment. Furthermore, it 
is reported that some liquidators make special donations to the staff of the Master’s Office 
designed to influence the appointment of liquidators.23 However, it must be assumed that in 
 
20 See Jocelyn Newmarch ‘Sequel to Corruption in Lesotho’ This Day 27 July 2004 at 13. 
21 See for an overview of the ‘arms-deal’ Transparency International ‘Country Study Report 2005’ (note 6) 
at 17 f. 
22 See for an overview of the ‘travelscam’ Transparency International ‘Country Study Report 2005’ (note 6) 
at 37 ff. 
23 http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2003/appendices/RESANALYSIS.htm (sub 7.6.3) (accessed 23. March 2005). 
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most countries only few judges will accept such an offer, because their legal education and 
professional integrity will probably keep many of them from doing so.24
b) Corruption within the private sector 
‘The extent of corruption has become endemic in business. In world terms cases such as the 
Enron scandal represents but the tip of a large iceberg. Such cases are quintessential 
examples of the failure of political and economic oversight, which may have been 
deliberately weakened by collusion between audit firms, banks and the media. Many 
investors were defrauded as a result and workers, usually the most vulnerable, were 
deprived of their hard earned pension to the detriment of their families and dependents.’25
 
Indeed, the predominant part of attention of the media and civil society is directed to the 
‘classic’ corruption in the public sector, while corruption wholly within the private sector is 
likewise very widespread and harmful and probably the most underestimated form of 
corruption. The most frequent purpose of corruption within the private sector is that one of 
several competitors pays a bribe to an employee of a company in order to obtain a contract 
from the latter or in order to influence the conditions of an already awarded contract to his 
advantage. Obviously, corruption within the private sector in order to obtain or manipulate 
contracts is quite similar to many cases of corruption in the public sector and only differs in 
that the customer is a private company instead of the state and in that the bribee is an 
employee instead of a public official.26 Such bribes, commonly called ‘kick-backs’27 in the 
economy, are very common and are supposed to affect a high percentage of business 
conducted between companies. 
 
Although most of the contracts affected by corruption concern either any kinds of goods or 
immaterial commercial services, there are also several cases, where companies, particularly 
credit-unworthy companies, have bribed bank-employees in order to obtain loans. The actual 
loss in such cases is potentially huge, because often the full loan will be a write-off for the 
bank. Furthermore, whole economies can be at risk of a collapse like the so-called ‘Asia-
crisis’ has demonstrated in 1997, which was predominantly caused by a high level of 
 
24 http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2003/appendices/RESANALYSIS.htm (sub 7.6.8); Transparency International 
‘Country Study Report 2005’ (note 6) at 50 (‘court system relatively untainted by corruption in the eyes of 
many South Africans’). 
25 Geraldine J. Fraser-Moleketi, Minister for the Public Service and Administration, Opening Statement at the 
Signing Ceremony of the United Nations Convention against Corruption on 9 December 2003 available at 
http://www.dpsa.gov.za/documents/speeches/openign%20statement03.pdf (accessed 15 August 2005). 
26 See the example on pp. 12 ff. 
27 See for an explanation of this term below p 13. 
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corruption within the financial sector.28 The China Banking Regulatory Commission has 
recently uncovered several corruption schemes worth R195 million. In one case the head of 
a firm bribed bank officials in order to obtain loans for his firm and caused an actual loss of 
almost R100 million.29 Following, various examples for corruption within the private sector 
will be explained. 
aa) Corruption within the health sector 
Another example of corruption within the private sector is the health sector, which is highly 
affected by corruption. It is estimated, that in South Africa 10 percent of the R11 billion 
welfare budget is absorbed by corruption, fraud, theft and inefficiency.30 Very common in 
this sector are bribes paid by pharmaceutical companies to doctors with the purpose to make 
them prescribe their drugs to their patients.31 For instance, a worldwide pharmaceutical 
company was recently accused to be paying bribes worth altogether 228 million US-$ to 
doctors in Italy as a counter-performance for the prescription of their products.32 These 
business methods are expected to be a part of a worldwide equal pattern. 
bb) Corruption within the media 
Bribery of journalists is also a dangerous form of corruption for any society. Big companies, 
for instance, frequently pay journalists of news-magazines for the delivery of manuscripts 
for the speeches of their representatives. It is also reported that banks regularly pay 
‘consulting fees’ to key-journalists.33 Consequently, these journalists will probably never 
report in a critical manner about the company and their managers in the future.34 The 
American company ‘Enron’, which broke down recently because of a huge amount of fraud 
and corruption committed by top-managers, also paid two journalists about 100.000 US-$ 
for ‘consulting’. These journalists have then allegedly tried to cover the criminal activities in 
 
28 Peter Eigen ‘Theoretische, wirtschaftliche und ethische Gesichtspunkte – Einleitung’. in Mark Pieth and 
Peter Eigen (eds) Korruption im internationalen Geschäftsverkehr (Neuwied and Kriftel, 1999) 11 at 12 f; 
Fritz Heimann and Carel Mohn ‘Die Rolle der Privatwirtschaft bei der Bekämpfung der internationalen 
Korruption’ in Mark Pieth and Peter Eigen (cited previously) 530 at 534; Thomas Pletscher ‘Wie halten wir 
unser Haus sauber?’ – Bekämpfung der Korruption aus Sicht der Wirtschaft in Mark Pieth and Peter Eigen 
(cited previously) 275 at 278. 
29 ‘Chinese banking watchdog uncovers massive fraud’ Cape Times 5 August 2004 at 21. 
30 ‘R1-billion a year tip-off’ Sunday Tribune 30 June 1996 at 2. 
31 See for real examples and the criminal liability of doctors in Germany Oliver Pragal ‘Das Pharma-
„Marketing“ um die niedergelassenen Kassenärzte: “Beauftragtenbestechung” gemäß § 299 StGB!’ (2005) 
Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 3 at 133 ff. 
32 ‘Thousands of Doctors named in Glaxo scandal’ The Independent 28 May 2004. 
33 Wolfgang Hetzer ‘Korruption. Legalisierung oder Bekämpfung?’ (2004) Kriminalpolitik at 86 ff. 
34 Hans Leyendecker ‘Korruption und Journalismus’ in Netzwerk Recherche (ed) Korruption: Schatten der 
demokratischen Gesellschaft. Fakten – Trends – Gegenstrategien (Wiesbaden, 2002) 29 at 30; Hans 
Leyendecker Die Korruptionsfalle (Reinbek, 2003) 152. 
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newspaper articles as their counter-performance.35 In other cases travel-journalists have 
been bribed with free flights and hotel-rooms by travel companies in order to induce 
enthusiastic reports about their products.36 In quite similar cases journalists of motorists-
magazines have been ‘invited’ to holidays, flight and first-class-hotel included, by car 
manufacturers in order to influence the results of their tests.37 It has also been reported about 
journalists of gourmet-guides, that some of them run wine-wholesales and only give the 
tested restaurants good marks, if they buy wine at their stores.38 Furthermore, there are 
hundreds of lists available in the internet containing companies that give discounts to 
journalists.39 Theses forms of corruption are not a criminal offence in a number of countries, 
eg in Germany. 
cc) Corruption within sports 
There are also numerous examples for corruption within sports. In most of these cases the 
bribe’s purpose was ‘match-fixing’, like it was in the German ‘Bundesliga-Skandal’, where 
soccer players have been bribed in order to perform badly in decisive matches, or as it 
happened in several other cases all over the world in cricket or soccer leagues.40 While 
bribing athletes is not a criminal offence in a number of countries, eg in Germany, it is 
punishable for example in South Africa41 and the US-States New York and California.42
2. The universal elements of corruption 
In order to understand the general structure of all forms of corruption and as a prerequisite 
for the evaluation of the PCCAA, it will be analysed following, which universal elements 
can be abstracted from these cases illustrated previously. To serve this purpose it is 
necessary to direct one’s attention to the legal and economic relations between the persons 
involved in corrupt activities and to their conduct. 
a) The ‘principal-agent-relationship’ 
 
35 See Transparency International ‘Global Corruption Report 2003’ at 52 available at 
http://www.globalcorruptionreport. org/download/gcr2003/ 06_Medias_role_(Peters).pdf  
36 Ibid. 
37 See Hans Leyendecker Die Korruptionsfalle 153. 
38 ‘Im Auftrag des guten Geschmacks’ Süddeutsche Zeitung 22 November 2003 at 3. 
39 Leyendecker Die Korruptionsfalle (note 34) at 155. 
40 ‘Speed issues corruption alert’ BBC News 12 May 2002 available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/cricket/3021877.stm (accessed on 15.8.2005). 
41 See section 15 of the PCCAA and in detail below p. 56. 
42 Dieter Dölling ‘Empfehlen sich Änderungen des Straf- und Strafprozessrechts, um der Gefahr von 
Korruption in Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft wirksam zu begegnen?’ Gutachten C für den 61. Deutschen 
Juristentag (München, 1996) C 1, 92. 
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Initially, it is of highest importance to realise that since the emergence of any kind of social 
and economic order our societies are characterised by the delegation of various tasks by 
individuals or entities to agents. This relationship is described as ‘principal-agency-
relationship’ in economic sciences and is the object of the so called ‘agency-theory’.43 
Subsequently it will be explained why a ‘principal-agency-relationship’ is an essential 
requirement for any kind of corruption and why the ‘agency-theory’ is of central meaning 
for a proper comprehension of the phenomenon ‘corruption’. 
 
Starting point of this theory is the fact that any sphere of life in modern societies, 
particularly politics, the public administration and the economy, depend on the delegation of 
various tasks from a principal to an agent. This division of labour is thus a basic requirement 
for the functioning of our societies on the whole and brings about a substantial increase of 
efficiency.  
 
In any democracy, for instance, the citizens vote for politicians and give them a mandate to 
organise the general public interests on their behalf as their representatives. The other way 
around, also the state as a juristic person can only execute the law by its public officials. 
With regard to the economy it is obvious, that companies as well do not operate as one-
person-entities, but often employ thousands of employees from top-managers to ordinary 
workers. This means, particularly for juristic persons like stock companies, that there is a 
separation of ownership (the stock-holders) and management (the managers and other 
employees). Obviously, the advantage of this delegation of tasks is a considerable increase 
of efficiency, because the huge number of stock-holders would practically never be able to 
conduct the great variety of the company’s daily business, for instance the negotiation and 
closure of contracts with suppliers. 
 
However, this increase of efficiency requires as a core-element of the ‘principal-agent-
relationship’ that the principal authorises his agent with discretion in order to allow him to 
conduct the affairs of the principal with various ‘opponents’ independently. As a 
consequence of the agent’s discretion, the principal is not able to supervise the agent’s 
conduct at any time. For instance, the owner of a company cannot keep his authorised 
 
43 Michael A Spence and Richard J Zeckhauser ‘Insurance, Information and Individual Action’ (1971) The 
American Economic Review 61 at 380 ff; Stephen A Ross ‘The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's 
Problem’ (1973) American Economic Review at 134 ff; Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling ‘Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) Journal of Financial 
Economics at 305 ff. 
signatory, purchase agents and justiciary under constant surveillance. Another property of 
the ‘principal-agent-relationship’ therefore is that information is distributed asymmetrically 
between the principal and the agent due to the agent’s discretion and independence. The 
principal can thus not infer from the result of the agent’s conduct whether the agent has 
acted loyally, because this result is influenced by a number of other factors. If, for instance, 
a purchase agent of a company negotiates and closes a sales contract with a supplier to 
disadvantageous conditions for his principal, he might either been bribed by the supplier or 
simply been defeated by the supplier’s skills of negotiation or his superior position in the 
market. 
 
It is therefore important to realise that representation of the principal’s affairs can easily be 
harmed by various kinds of disloyal conduct by the agent, so-called ‘agency-problems’44. 
Such ‘agency-problems’ can arise from the agent’s laziness, a criminal breach of trust, 
fraud, theft, embezzlement or, particularly, corruption. 
 
The following sketch illustrates examples for various relations between principals, their 
agents and the principal’s opponents in certain spheres of life where corruption might occur. 
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In absence of a ‘principal-agent-relationship’ corruption simply cannot occur, because a 
person who makes a decision concerning solely his own affairs will make rational and 
responsible decisions. As such a person will also be affected personally by the negative 
 
44 This term was first used by Ross (note 43) at 134. 
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consequences of his decision he will naturally not be willing to deviate from a reasonable 
decision for a bribe. 
 
It must therefore be emphasised that the existence of a ‘principal-agent-relationship’ is of 
central meaning and a basic requirement for any kinds of corruption.45 In a quite similar way 
Professor Snyman refers to the agency-theory, even if he does not expressively use these 
economic terms, as his abbreviated definition of corruption regarding the Corruption Act 94 
of 1992 stipulates that the bribee must be someone ‘[…] upon whom some power has been 
conferred or who has been charged with some duty […]’.46 Finally, various demands and 
proposals made during the drafting of the PCCAA ‘to broaden the scope to cover all agents 
[emphasis by the author]’ confirm, at least by implication, that the legislature as well 
regarded a ‘principal-agent-relationship’ as an essential requirement for corruption.47 
Accordingly, section 1(i) of the PCCAA defines agent as ‘any authorised representative 
who acts on behalf of his or her principal and includes a director, officer, employee or other 
person authorised to act on behalf of his or her principal, and “agency” has a 
corresponding meaning’. 
b) The relationship between the briber and the bribee and their conduct 
In order to understand the basic structure of any corrupt activity it is furthermore crucial to 
have a close look at the relationship between the agent (the bribee) and the principal’s 
‘opponent’ (the briber) and their factual conduct, because these are the actual reference 
points for the criminal law. Based on the aforementioned findings on the ‘principal-agent-
relationship’ it will be shown following that corruption is a specific ‘agency-conflict’ and it 
will be analysed in detail how this phenomenon functions by the illustration of an example 
of corruption within the economy. 
 
In this fictional example, a big car manufacturer needs 8000 gearboxes per month for his 
production of cars at a total price of R120.000.000. As a stock company and juristic person 
this car manufacturer is, naturally, not able to conclude contracts with suppliers without its 
managers or purchase agents. Consequently, the purchase agent of the car manufacturer has, 
 
45 Andrew W Goudie and David Stasavage Corruption: the Issues (Paris, 1997) at 4. 
46 CR Snyman (note 16) 376. 
47 Adv L J Roberts, Director of Public Prosecutions, Eastern Cape, Suggestions made during the Explanatory 
Memorandum of the Prevention of Corruption Bill (2 April 2002) available at http://www.pmg.org.za/ 
docs/2002/appendices/020422memo.htm (accessed 20.3.2005); Briefing of the Security and Constitutional 
Affairs Select Committee 29 January 2004 available at http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=3834 
(accessed on 14.5.2005). 
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by virtue of his contract of employment, to look for the best and cheapest supplier and 
negotiate the conditions of this contract to the best result for his principal. 
 
However, this ideal procedure can be undermined, if the purchase agent and a certain 
supplier (S) agree to collude against the car manufacturer. Originally, the purchase agent 
might have approached the supplier as he might have realised that his discretion is extremely 
valuable for the number of competing suppliers, because their turnover, profit and 
sometimes even their economical existence depend on the decision, who is awarded the 
contract. However, the agent’s discretion is at the same time actually worthless for him, 
because the manner he uses his discretion does not bring any benefits to him. Consequently, 
the agent might get the idea to use his discretion in order to increase his income by soliciting 
a bribe from one of the suppliers. However, a representative of the supplier can naturally 
also take the initiative and approach the agent first. 
 
The secret agreement proposed by either the agent or the supplier, typically stipulates that 
the supplier gives a percentage of the contract value to the agent, in the example given say 
5% or R6.000.000. The agent’s counter-performance is at first to conclude the contract on 
behalf of his principal with the bribing supplier instead of another competitor. Furthermore, 
it is quite common that the agent allows the supplier additionally to inflate the invoice for 
the delivered goods or services. This makes it not only possible for the supplier to re-finance 
the bribe paid to the agent, but in addition to obtain an extra-profit as well that would be out 
of reach in a legally-negotiated contract with a loyal agent. The fact that finally the principal 
pays the agent’s bribe by the increased contract value explains, why bribes paid in order to 
obtain a contract are also called ‘kick-backs’. This term is apparently derived from soccer 
and describes that that the supplier ‘kicks’ a part of the value of the awarded contract back to 
an agent within the sphere of the client (the principal).48
 
The following sketch illustrates the aforementioned principle of corruption. It must be 
emphasised that corruption in the public sector differs by no means from this principle. On 
the contrary, a corruption case like the South African ‘arms-deal’ functions equally, as the 
state is the principal and the members of government and parliament are its agents. 
 
 
48 Thomas Rönnau ‘“kick-backs“: Provisionsvereinbarungen als strafbare Untreue. Eine kritische 
Bestandsaufnahme’ in Hans Joachim Hirsch, Jürgen Wolter and Uwe Brauns (eds) Festschrift für Günter 
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It is of greatest importance to distinguish between the legal main-contract between the 
supplier and his client (the principal) that is affected by corruption on the one hand and the 
immediate corrupt agreement to collude between the agent and a representative of the 
supplier on the other hand.  
 
Furthermore, one must bear in mind with regard to the required scope of offences against 
corrupt activities that this sketch only describes the very basic structure of corruption. 
Firstly, it neglects the fact that the briber and the agent frequently agree that the bribe shall 
not be given directly to the agent, but to another person, for instance a member of the 
agent’s family, a company or a trust, in order to disguise the offence. Naturally, this 
camouflage shall not lead to an exclusion of criminal liability as the agent has agreed in the 
‘exchange-contract’ with the briber to decide in an unduely influenced manner and, 
furthermore, the bribe will eventually often still be beneficial for the agent indirectly. The 
following sketch illustrates this configuration. 
 
sketch 3: 
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Sketches 2 and 3 furthermore ignore that middlemen are often used by bribe-payers as 
intermediary between him and the bribee, particularly in high-profile cases of corruption.49 
The use of middlemen is for several reasons so established that even a profession of 
professional go-betweens has emerged in this regard.50 Firstly, their knowledge of the habits 
how to pave the way for a corrupt agreement and approach the right decision-maker is often 
invaluable. Secondly, a bribing company can practically circumvent the prohibitions to 
write-off the bribe as operating expenditure, which have been implemented in many 
countries, because the bribe is included in the fee paid to the middlemen and often declared 
as ‘commission’ for business-arrangements. Most of all, the middlemen is often used as a 
‘fall guy’ in case of a detection of the offence, because both parties can refer to their 
supposed ignorance of the middlemen’s conduct and claim that he was solely instructed to 
                                                 
49 See for a more detailed analysis of the role of middlemen Johann Graf Lambsdorff ‘Korruption als 
mühseliges Geschäft – eine Transaktionskostenanalyse’ in Mark Pieth and Peter Eigen (eds) Korruption im 
internationalen Geschäftsverkehr (Neuwied and Kriftel, 1999) 56 at 62 ff; see regarding the technical 
challenges for the criminal law below p. 29. 
50 ‘Der Schmierer – Ein bisschen Bares, schon läuft der Laden’ Frankfurter Rundschau 5 December 2003, 
available at http://www.tebiko.de/t/s/schmierer (accessed on 10.8.2005). 
mediate legally between both parties. The former Chief Executive Officer of Elf-Aquitaine, 
who was accused in relation to one of the biggest corruption scandals in Europe, stated in 
this regard: ‘If someone uses an intermediary, he does so exclusively, because he does not 
really want to know what he is doing.’51  
 
Middlemen are predominantly mandated by the briber, because the decision-maker does not 
have a comparable need to search for the right ‘partner’ and, furthermore, it is a specific 
need of bribing companies to use the intermediary in order to camouflage the bribe as 
operating expenditure for consulting fees. However, an intermediary can sometimes also 
occur within the sphere of the bribee. The outcome of the so-called ‘Schaik-Trial’ in 
Durban, for instance, has shown that Schaik was apparently a middleman between former 
Vice-President Jacob Zuma and European arms companies in the ‘arms-deal’-corruption 
case.52 The following sketch illustrates the typical use of intermediaries by the briber. 
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51 ‘Agents pocketed millions in German oil-deal, Elf trial’ AFP-news 30 April 2003 available at 
http://forums.transnationale.org/viewtopic.php?t=1823 (accessed 10.7.2005). 
gearbox-supplier (S) 
(opponent of principal) 
52 See S v Schabir Shaik & 11 others, p 6551 (‘We have no doubt that […] this document reports the 
conclusion on an agreement reached by Shaik and Thetard that Thomson would pay Jacob Zuma R500 000 a 
year […] in order to secure the two benefits for Thomson, namely that he would provide a present protection 
from the corvette acquisition investigation and hereafter help in securing Government contracts in the 
future.’). 
 
With regard to the required scope of the criminal law one must further consider that the 
perpetration of corruption often, unlike offence like murder, theft or robbery, develops over 
certain stages. Basically, any corrupt activity starts with an offer to conclude a corrupt 
agreement either by the agent or a representative of the ‘opponent’, which is possibly 
followed by its acceptance by the other part. Subsequently, the bribe is either performed first 
or the corruptly influenced decision is made, e.g. a contract is awarded. Eventually, the 
transaction in question is carried out.53
 
However, one must furthermore pay due consideration to the preceding practice of the so-
called ‘feeding’, a term that is derived from fishing and describes within this context the 
required preparations for a successful catch. With regard to corruption ‘feeding’ describes a 
typical practice during the contacting-phase between the briber and the bribee before a 
concrete offer to act corruptly is made by either side. During this stage the person seeking 
influence often gives various gratifications to the decision-maker without any reference to 
any decision to be influenced as counter-performance.54 The purpose of this practice is on 
one hand to ‘test’ the willingness of the decision-maker to make a corruptly influenced 
decision at a later stage and to build up trust in order to reduce the risk of denunciation. On 
the other hand the ‘feeder’ even gains means to coerce the recipient in the case that the latter 
is reluctant to make an influenced decision, because he can threaten him with a report to his 





       













3. A proposal to define corruption from a juristic-economic point of view 
Corruption is a crime that is seldom perpetrated spontaneously, but, on the contrary, most 
perpetrators balance the prospective profit carefully against the possible risks. Particularly, if 
corruption is committed systematically by companies in order to promote their business, it 
  17   
                                                 
53 See regarding the challenges for the criminal law in this respect below pp 22 ff. 
54 See regarding the challenges for the criminal law to cover the so-called ‘feeding’, pp 25 ff. 
55 See for the possibility of coercion of the receiver below p 26. 
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becomes obvious that such forms of ‘white-collar’-criminality should not only be analysed 
from a legal, but also from an economic point of view. Such an economic analysis is, in my 
opinion, for several reasons of invaluable benefit for a sharp definition of corruption. 
 
If one looks at the corrupt agreement between the agent and the ‘opponent’ of his principal, 
it must be considered that economic sciences regard this agreement simply as the conclusion 
of an illegal exchange contract between the briber and the bribee.56 However, this definition 
can only provide a working basis and needs further concretisation as it is still too vague. 
Further information on the essence of corruption can be obtained through an analysis of the 
obligations to be performed by both parties in the framework of this exchange contract, 
although it must be emphasised that most legal systems naturally regard such collusive 
agreements as ineffective. In this respect, the primary obligation to be performed by the 
bribee is to ‘sell’ his discretion to manage the affairs of his principal for the benefit of the 
briber. To put it another way, the briber simply ‘buys’ the agent’s decision, eg to win the 
contract and be allowed to inflate the invoice. The bribe-payer’s counter-performance is 
naturally to pay the bribe, which can be any kind of material or immaterial benefit. As both 
parties, the briber and the bribee, are acting within this exchange, it is in my opinion 
misleading to distinguish between ‘active’ corruption (by the briber) and ‘passive’ 
corruption (by the bribee), although this distinction is customary.57
 
With regard to the definition of corruption it is crucial to integrate these obligations to be 
performed, particularly the bribee’s obligation to ‘sell’ his discretion, into the definition, 
because otherwise it would likewise cover other illegal exchanges like drug or arms 
trafficking. However, corruption differs significantly from such offences in that one of the 
principal obligations of the exchange-contract between the briber and the briber is that the 
former ‘sells’ a decision or discretion respectively. 
 
Finally, it must be emphasised that the illegality of this exchange is an essential element of 
this definition, because it is an inherent element of human nature and the base of any 
 
56 See Schubert in Heinz-Bernd Wabnitz and Thomas Janovsky Handbuch des Wirtschafts- und 
Steuerstrafrechts (eds). 2ed. (München, 2004) 10. Kapitel Rn 2; Silvio Borner and Christophe Schwyzer, 
‘Die Bekämpfung der Bestechung im Lichte der Neuen Politischen Ökonomie’ in Mark Pieth and Peter 
Eigen (eds) Korruption im internationalen Geschäftsverkehr (Neuwied and Kriftel, 1999) 17 at 24; Klaus 
Volk (note 12) 419 at 421; Günther Heine ‘Korruptionsbekämpfung im Geschäftsverkehr durch Strafrecht? 
Internationale Entwicklungen und nationale Befunde.’ (2002) Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 
Band 138 (Heft 9) 533 at 544 ff. 
57 See CR Snyman (note 16) 376. 
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economy to exchange goods and services. In a quite similar manner Professor Burchell 
points out that ‘the concept of corruption as the giving and receiving of rewards is 
complicated by the fact that the giving of gifts in appreciation of services rendered 
(‘reciprocities’) is a normal and acceptable practice in society. The difficulty of separating 
legitimate reciprocity from a corrupt bribe renders the application of the law not always a 
simple manner.’58 Professor Snyman emphasises in a similar manner that the term 
‘corruptly’ used by the Corruption Act 94 of 1992 must be interpreted to refer to the 
requirement of unlawfulness […].59 Without the restriction to illegal or unlawful exchanges, 
the definition of corruption would therefore also cover the huge majority of legal exchanges 
within the economy and thus be not only much too broad, but even completely useless.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that corruption is from a juristic-economic point of view 
basically an illegal or rule-breaking exchange of a delegated decision for any material or 
immaterial benefit (the bribe) between an agent and a third party (the briber).  
III. Technical challenges for laws combating corruption 
Against the background of the actual structure of corruption as analysed previously, the 
specific legislative challenges for the establishment of offences against corruption will be 
analysed subsequently. The abstract discussion of these challenges up front will 
subsequently be of great use for the purpose of evaluating the merits and flaws of the 
offences as stipulated by the PCCAA. 
1. The ‘fixing’ of the illegality of the corrupt exchange 
Considering that corruption is basically an illegal exchange of a bribe against a certain 
decision of an agent, it becomes quite clear in view of the vast number of goods and services 
exchanged legally within any economy that the statutory ‘fixing’ of the illegality of the 
exchanges to be punished is the biggest challenge for the criminal law.60 This means that 
any offence against corruption must be able to distinguish corrupt activities from legal 
exchanges. 
a) The sources of applicable law 
The fixing of the illegality requires in the first place a choice between various sources of law 
that can be applied. If, for instance, the mayor of a city awards a contract to build a new 
 
58 Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 889. 
59 CR Snyman (note 16) 381. 
60 See detailed Günther Heine (note 56) 533 at 544; Klaus Volk (note 12) 419 at 421, 425. 
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public building to a construction company that has previously bribed him, the illegality of 
his conduct can theoretically be judged from the point of view of: (1) the public law, (2) the 
civil service law, (3) the civil law and, finally, (4) the constitution. With regard to this 
example it might be relatively clear that the public law and the civil service law are more 
special and therefore decisive. However, there are spheres of live where either the choice 
between various sources of law might be far from clear or where no statutory rules exist at 
all. 
 
Such problems arise for several reasons particularly with regard to corruption in the private 
sector. Firstly, the exchange of goods and services is a basic principle of any economy and 
thus the variety of concluded exchanges is overwhelming and difficult to grasp. Secondly, 
egoism, profit-seeking and even greed are legitimate to a much broader extent within the 
economy, than in politics and administration. Thirdly, the rules concerning the private sector 
are generally less precise and less detailed than the civil service law that applies to public 
officials. Professor Snyman points out in this regard: ‘It is, however, often difficult to 
distinguish between corruption in the private sector and certain normal and accepted 
business practices such as business lunches and the use of lodges at sports stadiums (to 
which a company invites other people – often representatives of other companies).’61 In a 
similar sense respondents in the trade union, media and prosecutors asked in a Business 
Survey on Corruption said that ‘a clear understanding of what constitutes corruption is 
complicated by the fact that what is acceptable and commonplace in business can be viewed 
as unacceptable when taxpayer’s money is involved’.62 Parliamentarians expressed a similar 
belief and emphasised that the mandate of the private sector is different to the mandate of 
the public sector. Private sector companies may offer prospective clients business trips in 
order to curry favour and to clinch a deal; however, it is considered unacceptable for public 
officials to be ‘courted’ in this way.63 Nevertheless, particularly the latter statement is 
somewhat sweeping and incorrect as it does not distinguish, whether ‘the client’ is, for 
instance, a self-employed entrepreneur or an agent of the client. 
 
But most of all, the fixing of the illegality of the exchange is very difficult in the private 
sector, because there are two completely different sources of law that apply to the agent’s 
behaviour: the agent’s employment contract as ‘interior rules’ or the law on competition as 
 
61 CR Snyman (note 16) 381. 
62 See Business Survey on Corruption (note 24) sub 7.6.1. 
63 Ibid. 
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‘exterior rules’.64 The choice between one of these sources of law is fundamental in respect 
of offences against corruption within the private sector, because the criminal liability of the 
agent and the briber depends on this choice in the case that the principal authorises the 
corrupt behaviour of his agent. Although such cases are naturally rather seldom, one such 
case was judged by the German Reichsgericht, where a dealer of sparkling wine bribed the 
waiters (the agent) of a restaurant with authorisation of its owner (the principal) in order to 
make the waiters ‘recommend’ the dealer’s sparkling wine instead of other brands to the 
guests.65  
 
If the ‘interior’ rules were held decisive, as they are in respect of the crime of breach of 
trust, the agent would not be liable, because in view of the principal’s authorisation there 
would be no violation of duties deriving from his employment contract. However, the 
commercial interests of the dealer’s competitors and the consumers were harmed 
nevertheless. If instead the law on competition as ‘exterior’ rules were held decisive, the 
agent would be liable, because an infringement of the law on competition does not depend 
on a breach of the agent’s employment contract. The German federal court decided that the 
principal’s authorisation is irrelevant, because the principal is not allowed to dispose of the 
interests of competitors and consumers.66
 
Consequently, it can be inferred from this state of affairs that it is generally much more 
difficult to assess a certain conduct as corrupt and to draft offences concerning this with 
regard to the private sector, than it is with regard to conduct in the public sector. With regard 
to corruption within the private sector the decisive challenge is, like in the whole penal law 
concerning business offences, to distinguish between corruption and business practice that 
can better be described as ‘crafty’ or ‘rough’ in nature but not illegal. Professor Heine 
pointed out in respect of this problem: ‘The statutory fixing of the illegality of the exchange 
is the symptomatic dilemma of corruption in the private sector’67. However, it can basically 
be said that it is in any case illicit corrupt conduct, if an ‘opponent’ of a principal bribes an 
agent in order to influence the agent’s discretion regarding the handling of the principal’s 
affairs for his benefit. 
 
 
64 See Klaus Volk (note 12) 419 at 422, 426 f; similar Günther Heine (note 56) 533 at 547. 
65 RGSt (Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen) 48, 291-305. 
66 RGSt 48, 291 (293). 
67 See Günther Heine (note 56) 533 at 545. 
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b) The reference point of the illegality-verdict 
Apart from the question of the source of the applicable law, the verdict of the illegality of 
the exchange in question also has various possible reference points in respect of the actual 
conduct. These reference points are: (1) the reception of the gratification in itself, (2) the 
abuse of discretion by the agent with regard to his corruptly influenced decision or (3) the 
link between the gratification and the agent’s decision in the sense of an illicit quid pro quo. 
 
With regard to corruption in the public sector one must consider at first that in most 
countries of the world any public official that takes a gratification besides his official salary, 
which does not exclusively has a private link, violates public service law. Furthermore, the 
public official infringes public law, if he takes inappropriate criterions into consideration for 
a decision instead of the public weal, eg if he awards a contract to a non-competitive bidder 
solely because the latter gives him a bribe. Consequently, in respect of the public sector, the 
link between the bribe and the decision as its counter-performance only strengthens the 
verdict that the public official acted corruptly, but is not essential in order to establish the 
illegality of the conduct. 
 
So far as corruption in the private sector is concerned, one must consider that private 
persons are as a matter of principle not restricted in making donations to each other and thus 
the reception of a gratification can hardly be judged as illegal in itself. Furthermore, there 
are no statutory laws that regulate the manner in which an agent of a private person or a 
company has to use his discretion. Thus, with regard to corruption in the private sector the 
verdict of the illegality of the conduct depends to a much greater extent on the inappropriate 
link between the gratification and the influenced decision. This state of affairs also explains 
why the so-called ‘feeding’, ie gratifications given during the contacting-phase without any 
reference to a certain decision to be influenced, is much harder to combat by the criminal 
law within the private sector than it is in the public sector.68
2. The criminalisation of ‘material’ attempts as ‘formal’ completed offences 
It was already mentioned that any corrupt activity extends over various stages and that the 
criminal law can, in theory, establish a liability at various moments during this process: (1) 
the possibly stage of ‘feeding’, (2) the initial offer by one part, (3) its acceptance, (4) the 
 
68 See below p 27. 
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performance of the bribe and (5) the making of the influenced decision, and, finally, (6) the 
carrying out of the transaction in question.69
 
Most legal systems impose the full criminal liability of a completed offence already when an 
unilateral offer to act corruptly is made either by the briber or the bribee, regardless of its 
later acceptance and regardless, if the bribe was indeed given later and if the particular 
decision was indeed made subsequently. For instance, the Corruption Act 94 of 1992 of 
South Africa criminalised by virtue of its section 1(1)(a) and (b) the ‘offer’ by the briber or 
respectively the ‘attempt to obtain’ any benefit by the bribee. Professor Snyman rightly 
comments on this section that ‘to make an offer is tantamount to attempting to commit this 
form of corruption, and for this reason a person who has made an offer cannot allege that 
she should be convicted merely of an attempt to commit the crime in this form, as opposed 
to the completed crime.’70 It is therefore unlikely that a person could be guilty of only 
attempting to commit this form of the crime and a conviction of attempt is only possible, if 
eg a posted offer to bribe is intercepted in the post.71 Similarly, section 2(3) of the PCCAA 
as well as § 299 (which relate to employees in the private sector) and §§ 331-334 of the 
StGB (which relate to public officials) also penalise mere offers of and demands for 
bribes.72
 
Following, it will be analysed, why the law equates completed corrupt activities with mere 
unilateral offers instead of punishing the latter as a mere attempt that deserves a mitigation 
of punishment. At first sight one might indeed judge a unilateral offer, particularly if the 
other party has rejected it, as a mere attempt of corruption, because no exchange of a bribe 
against a decision is made. Furthermore, there is in absence of a completed transaction no 
immediate harm done.  
 
However, one must consider in this respect that it can be distinguished whether an offence is 
completed either in a formal or in a material sense. An offence is formally completed, if its 
elements of crime are completely fulfilled, while it is only materially completed, if the 
actual harm that it tries to prevent is actually done.73 Ordinarily, these events almost 
coincide, e.g. regarding the crime of murder. However, there are particular offences that 
 
69 See above pp 17 f (sketch 5). 
70 CR Snyman (note 16) 379. 
71 CR Snyman (note 16) 379 (sub footnote 15). 
72 See Appendix p 68. 
73 Johannes Wessels and Werner Beulke Strafrecht - Allgemeiner Teil 33ed (Heidelberg, 2003) 201. 
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have such an early formal completion that this conduct is nevertheless just a material 
attempt, because the specific harm that the offence intends to prevent is not yet done.74
 
Under German criminal law, for instance, theft is already formally completed when the thief 
appropriates the object with the intention to keep it, eg when a shoplifter has put a package 
of cigarettes in his pocket.75 However, the owner will only suffer a material loss and the 
offence will thus only be materially completed, if the shoplifter indeed leaves the shop with 
the stolen property and manages to deprive the owner of his property for a substantial 
amount of time.76 Furthermore, the offence of forgery is already completed as soon as the 
forged document is made with the intention to use it subsequently, but any harm can only 
happen when it is indeed used in legal relations, which is not required eg by the German 
law.77 Such offences are called ‘offences with incongruent mens rea’ (Delikte mit 
überschießender Innentendenz78) in the German criminal law, because their mens rea 
contains more elements (e.g. the intention to use the forged document) than their actus reus 
(which merely requires the production of the document). The rationale behind such offences 
basically is that certain material attempts, eg the mere production of a forged document, are 
so dangerous and harmful that the law must treat those already as formally completed 
offences.79 This legislative technique furthermore aims to exclude the possibility of a 
renunciation and the facultative mitigation of punishment, which applies for attempts.80
 
In order to understand the underlying rationale for the advanced criminal liability of 
offences combating corruption one must carefully consider the harmful effects of corruption 
on society. At first one must bear in mind that corruption is materially only completed, if the 
briber and the bribee both agree to their exchange-contract, the bribed agent has made the 
influenced decision and the transaction in question between the principal and the bribee is 
concluded. On the contrary, if both parts have only agreed to act corruptly or if either even 
has declined to bribe or to be bribed one would ordinarily only speak of an attempt, because 
no immediate harm is caused yet. With regard to the bilateral agreements, one might still 
argue that the abstract likelihood that the agreed transaction will indeed be carried out 
subsequently justifies the penalisation of such conduct. However, this argument is not valid 
 
74 Günther Jakobs Strafrecht - Allgemeiner Teil 2ed (Berlin, New York, 1991) 706. 
75 Johannes Wessels and Thomas Hillenkamp Strafrecht - Besonderer Teil/2 24ed (Heidelberg, 2001) 39. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Johannes Wessels and Michael Hettinger Strafrecht - Besonderer Teil/1 27ed (Heidelberg, 2003) 218.  
78 Johannes Wessels and Werner Beulke (note 73) 77. 
79 See Günther Jakobs (note 74) 280. 
80 Ibid. 
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in the latter case, because there is no possibility of any immediate harm at all, if the other 
part refuses the offer, eg if the ‘attempt’ of a drunken driver to bribe a policeman fails 
because the latter appears to be incorruptible. 
 
Consequently, there must be another justification for the penalisation of such material 
attempts as formal completed offences. This justification indeed exists in the shape of the 
so-called ‘spiral-effect’.81 This term describes the specific effect that a single offence of 
corruption seldom remains an isolated act in society, because if one individual tries to gain 
advantages through corruption, others soon will develop mistrust regarding the proper 
functioning of the whole system. Thus, they will reckon to suffer disadvantages if they 
continue to refrain from corruption and sooner or later also try to compensate them by 
furthering their interest by corrupting. Consequently, soon a system of widespread and 
structural rooted corruption will emerge where nothing works without bribes and where it is 
very difficult to combat corruption. It is crucial to comprehend that this ‘spiral-effect’ does 
not only occur, if a corrupt activity is materially completed, but likewise takes effect, if the 
other part refuses to bribe or to be bribed. The reason is that any offer to bribe already shows 
the general willingness of the certain perpetrator to act corruptly and thus competitors can 
never be sure whether the briber has eventually managed to bribe the certain agent. 
Therefore even the mere possibility of gossip about a failed (material) ‘attempt’ of 
corruption destroys the trust of competitors in the lawful functioning of the system and 
triggers the ‘spiral-effect’. Thus, it is justified to penalise already a failed offer to act 
corruptly with the full might of the law, even if it is rejected, because any mistrust by 
competitors causes the ‘spiral-effect’ and induces them to bribe as well. 
3. The criminalisation of the contacting-phase 
Another major challenge for the criminal law is the due penalisation of the contacting-phase 
of corrupt activities, the so-called ‘feeding’.82 Corruption, particularly its organised and 
high-profile appearances, seldom happen spontaneously without any prior preparation and 
contact between the briber and the bribee in order to pave the way. Only low-profile forms 
of corruption usually occur without a contacting-phase and these forms are at the same time 
often highly risky, e.g. the attempt by a drunken driver to bribe a policeman. 
 
81 See for a detailed analysis of this phenomenon Manfred Teufel Insolvenzkriminalität – 
Wirtschaftskriminalität (PhD, Lübeck, 1981) 55; Klaus Tiedemann Wirtschaftsstrafrecht und 
Wirtschaftskriminalität. Teil 1 (Reinbek 1976) 25 f; Gunther Arzt and Ulrich Weber Strafrecht - Besonderer 
Teil (Bielefeld, 2000) § 19 Rn 15. 
82 See above pp 17 ff. 
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The reason for the frequent use of ‘feeding’ becomes apparent if one considers the situation 
of a perpetrator who aims at bribing a certain agent. This perpetrator is then facing the 
dilemma of either taking the chance of being reported to the prosecuting authorities by a 
possibly incorruptible agent or refraining from his plan. Obviously, the sales chief of an 
arms manufacturer cannot abruptly enter the (Vice-) President’s office carrying a briefcase 
brimming with money as the counter-performance for the awarding of an arms-contract. 
However, there is a possibility that offers him a solution to minimise this risk. In the 
example given the sales chief might at first contact the (Vice-) President during a harmless 
appointment without making any reference to arms procurement projects. They might go 
sailing or playing golf together under any pretext and the sales-chief might invite the (Vice-) 
President to an expensive dinner. Subsequently, the sales-chief might offer him his yacht or 
luxury holiday flat for a holiday with his wife without demanding and expecting any 
counter-performance. At a later stage the sales chief might try to discover the (Vice-) 
President’s ‘weak points’, eg if he lives beyond his means. Only then, after a certain level of 
faith has developed, the sales chief might offer the minister to ‘help’ him, for instance, by 
paying off his loans, if the (Vice-) President’s will promote the procurement of arms from 
his company. 
 
At that stage the ‘fed’ agent will often be willing to accept this offer without any further 
pressure, because he probably got used to his lifestyle and the financial support. However, if 
the certain agent still has scruples to comply, he can also be compelled to do so through a 
threat of disclosure, because the mere fact that he has received valuable benefits by an arms 
company will already constitute a disciplinary offence, cause a scandal and might force him 
to resign, regardless that no decision was unduely influenced so far. The ‘feeder’ can 
furthermore indeed carry out such a threat of disclosure credibly, because its consequences 
are generally less severe for him.83 Consequently, the practice of ‘feeding’ is very 
dangerous, because it is often an important interim-step in respect of the development of 
corrupt relationships. Furthermore, ‘feeding’ destroys the trust of honest competitors and 
citizens in the constitutional state and the market economy and therefore contributes to an 
overall culture of corruption. 
 
The reasons, why the practice of ‘feeding’ is a challenge for the criminal law, appear if one 
considers that the nature of corruption is, as aforementioned, an illegal exchange of any 
 
83 See detailed for the possibility of coercion Johann Graf Lambsdorff (note 49) 56 at 76. 
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gratification for an agent’s decision, or at least an unilateral offer or a bilateral agreement to 
carry out such an exchange in the future.84 Obviously, gratifications that are only given to an 
agent in order to build up trust and to pave the way for a future offence of corruption do not 
meet the requirements of this definition as they lack any reference to a counter-performance 
by the agent. Consequently, the criminal law cannot tie the verdict of illegality of the 
conduct to an illicit link between a gratification and the agent’s decision as no decision is 
referred to at all.85
 
For the same reasons and against the background of the explanations given earlier on 
‘material’ and ‘formal’ attempts86 it must be emphasised that the practice of ‘feeding’ 
cannot be judged as an attempt of an offence of corruption, eg the failed ‘attempt’ of a 
drunken driver to bribe a policeman to avoid a fine. Firstly, the actus reus of ‘feeding’ does 
not contain the expressive or at least implied demand for an unduely influenced decision as 
counter-performance for the gratification. Secondly, also the mens rea solely refers to the 
offered or given gratification, but naturally does not contain any reference to an unduely 
influenced decision as well. On the contrary, e.g. section 3 (general offence of corruption) of 
the PCCAA requires at least that ‘[…] the accused’s aim was […] to influence 
another […].87
 
As neither the actus reus nor the mens rea of ‘feeding’ refer to any decision of the agent to 
be influenced, the criminal law can consequently only refer to the illegality of the 
gratification itself, which makes the verdict of illegality much harder to pass than in respect 
of an illicit quid quo pro between a gratification and a certain decision. Although most 
public service and public laws generally prohibit any substantial gratifications to public 
officials, some perpetrators might defend themselves by arguing that they are old friends and 
thus cannot be prohibited from making each other donations or help each other in a financial 
crisis. With regard to public officials judges might still be able to reject such statements in 
many cases as incredible, because the integrity of the public service justifies a zero-tolerance 
approach. 
 
However, with regard to agents within the private sector the due criminalisation of ‘feeding’ 
is more complicated, because egoism, profit-seeking and even greed is admissible to a 
 
84 See above pp 17 ff. 
85 See above p 22. 
86 See above p 22. 
87 See Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 893. 
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greater extent than it is in the public sector. Although some principals might have restricted 
the reception of gratifications by their agents contractually, there are no general statutory 
rules existing. Particularly in established business relations businessmen often become 
friends and often make each other presents on certain occasions. For these reasons, the 
verdict of illegality is much harder to pass than in the public sector. This state of affairs 
might explain why §§ 331 and 333 of the German StGB criminalise ‘feeding’ exclusively 
with regard to public officials.88  
 
However, it must be considered that such presents between businessmen are only harmless, 
if the recipient is acting in a self-employed capacity as a principal, eg as the owner of a 
company, because he will never make a disadvantageous decision in order to get a bribe as 
he would harm his own interests.89 If a business-partner gives a benefit to an agent of his 
client, the concrete risk arises that the agent secretly shifts the sides and starts to collude 
with the supplier to the disadvantage of his principal. 
 
In theory, there are two legislative methods to design offences in order combat ‘feeding’ 
without criminalising legitimate presents or assistance among friends. One possibility might 
be to restrict the criminal liability of gratifications explicitly to cases, where there is a 
reasonable risk that the gratification offered or given to the agent will influence his 
discretion in the future to the disadvantage of his principal or society. Although this criterion 
might on the one hand be the right one from a material point of view, because it perfectly 
combats the typical danger of ‘feeding’, it will on the other hand cause unacceptable 
vagueness.  
 
One should therefore give preference to a formal criterion that links the verdict of illegality 
to the interior relation between the agent and his principal. Such an offence should impose 
criminal liability on the ‘feeder’ as well as the agent, if the principal has not authorised the 
gratification given to his agent by the ‘feeder’. Consequently, authorised and thus legitimate 
donations between agents and business-partners of their principals are admissible, but 
secretly made gratifications will constitute an offence. For instance, section 10 of South 
Africa’s PCCAA, which establishes an offence of unauthorised gratifications in respect of 
public as well as private employees, has chosen this approach.90
 
88 See Appendix, p 68. 
89 See above p 11. 
90 See below p 51. 
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4. The avoidance of undesirable loopholes 
It was already mentioned that only the basic structure of corruption is an illegal exchange 
between the briber and the bribee, but especially non-spontaneous, organised forms of 
corruption often deviate from this structure in that the bribe is not given directly to the 
bribee but to a third person and in that intermediaries are involved.91 The criminal law 
therefore must consider these practices in order to avoid loopholes. 
a) Bribes given to third persons 
In order to camouflage corruption, the briber and the bribee frequently agree that the briber 
should perform the bribe to a third person, for instance, to the agent’s spouse or to a 
consulting company of the agent, which is often founded exclusively in order to camouflage 
bribes.92 Each offence that aims to combat corruption efficiently must therefore be designed 
in a manner that includes such conduct in order to avoid loopholes. In this regard it must be 
emphasised that it is not advisable for the criminal law to require that the bribee must at least 
benefit indirectly from the bribe given to the third person. The reason is that although the 
bribee will indeed often receive the bribe finally or benefit in another way, ‘altruistic’ forms 
of bribery, where the agent does not benefit personally at all, might sometimes also occur. 
The corrupt agent might, for instance, demand that the benefit should be given to a family 
member, e.g. he might demand a car or scholarship for his son. Additionally, the state then 
had to prove that the bribe has indirectly reached the bribee, or at least that this was 
intended, which might not always be a simple matter. 
 
Consequently, the particular offences should simply stipulate that the bribe must be 
demanded or received by the agent for the benefit of himself or for the benefit of a third 
person or offered or given respectively by the briber in a corresponding manner. 
b) The use of intermediaries 
As already mentioned, bribe-payers often use intermediaries in order to benefit from their 
contacts and knowledge and, most of all, in order to delegate the risks of the offence due to 
the fact that they can blame the intermediary as a ‘fall-guy’ in the case of detection.93 
Consequently, there is a substantial practical need to criminalise corruption perpetrated with 
the use of intermediaries and the law should punish the briber, the intermediary and the 
bribee equally. Any offence aiming to combat corruption efficiently must therefore be 
 
91 See above pp 14 f (sketch 3), 15 f (sketch 4). 
92 See above pp 14 (sketch 3). 
93 See above p 15 f (sketch 4). 
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formulated in a manner that includes bribes being paid directly and indirectly by any person, 
so that bribes being paid by the briber personally as well as such paid by an intermediary on 
his behalf are included. 
5. The mens rea: a major obstacle for the prosecution of corruption? 
According to the rule in law actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea (the act is not wrongful 
unless the mind is guilty), it is a firmly established principle of criminal justice that there 
must be fault or mens rea on the part of the accused in order to be held criminally liable.94 
As strict liability is an exceptional, and arguably questionable, form of liability, that 
traditionally only applied to ‘regulatory’ or ‘public welfare offences’, the usual form of 
liability in statutory offences is intention.95  
 
With regard to offences combating corruption the required mens rea naturally depends on 
the formulation of the particular offence in question. However, there are also general 
challenges concerning the designing offences in respect of their mens rea, which should be 
considered by the legislature. The major challenge in this regard arises from the fact that the 
actus reus of most offences combating corruption is already completed at the early stage of a 
mere ‘material attempt’, for instance, when a bribe is offered to an agent and rejected by the 
latter.96 Furthermore, bribes often do not consist of money, but are instead, particularly so 
far as organised, high-profile forms of corruption are concerned, often camouflaged as 
consulting fees or similar benefits, which are seemingly adequate in a social sense. For these 
reasons, the concrete actus reus of offences combating corruption does not always appear 
likewise harmful and blameworthy at first sight as the actus reus of other offences, e.g. theft, 
robbery, embezzlement or breach of trust. Consequently, the justification of the 
criminalisation of such conduct depends to a larger extent on the mens rea, ie on the idea of 
the perpetrator to link a benefit offered to or demanded by the agent with a corruptly 
influenced decision to be made by the agent. The aim of the agent and the briber to collude 
to the disadvantage of his principal and society on the whole represents the real harmful and 
blameworthy conduct, although it must not necessarily be performed. 
 
The aforementioned state of affairs implies that the adequate form of dolus for offences 
combating corruption might be dolus directus.97 This intention then referred on the one hand 
 
94 Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 455. 
95 Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 499. 
96 See above pp 17 (sketch 5), 22. 
97 See generally in respect of dolus directus Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 461. 
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to the actus reus of the perpetrator, i.e. the offering, demanding, etc. of a bribe and, on the 
other hand, without equivalent within the actus reus, to his aim to induce (briber) or 
respectively perform (bribee) an unduely influenced decision. Section 1(1) of the Corruption 
Act 94 of 1992, for instance, required ‘the intention to influence the person upon whom such 
power has been conferred’. Consequently, the mens rea of such offences contains more 
elements than the actus reus, which is an example for a legislative technique called 
‘offences with incongruent mens rea’ (Delikte mit überschießender Innentendenz) in the 
German criminal law.98 In accordance with this view, Professor Snyman commented on the 
Corruption Act 94 of 1992 that it were a crime of ‘double intention’, which, firstly, relates to 
the giving (briber) or receiving (bribee) of the bribe and, secondly, to the intention to 
influence the bribee in a certain way in the future (briber) or to commit or omit to do any act 
in relation to such powers or duty (bribee).99 Obviously, the second reference point of the 
intention will often be very hard to prove, because, firstly, it has no already completed 
equivalent in the actus reus and, secondly, perpetrators might state that they never indeed 
intended to perform (bribee) or induce (briber) a corruptly influenced decision. 
 
However, there is an alternative to this concept of ‘double intention’ and the construction of 
‘offences with incongruent mens rea’, which is able to solve this evidentiary problem 
adequately.100 Starting point of this concept is the fact that corruption is basically an illegal 
exchange contract between the briber and the bribee,101 which is thus, like the conclusion of 
any treaty in the civil law, based on declarations of intention. With regard to the structure of 
declarations of intention it must be borne in mind that any such declaration persists of an 
expressively or tacitly uttered objective part and a corresponding intention to act and the 
intention to state something of legal consequence as its subjective part.102 It is crucial for the 
following alternative construction of the actus reus and mens rea of corruption to take into 
consideration that the extent of the obligations under any contract result from the objective 
part of the declaration of intention, even if it is implied and therefore requires interpretation. 
This declaration is furthermore already effective if the declaring person has the intention to 
act and the intention to state something of legal consequence. However, the intention 
underlying a transaction, which contains the intention to indeed conclude and perform the 
 
98 See above p 24. 
99 See CR Snyman (note 16) 382, 385. 
100 See detailed Oliver Pragal Die Korruption innerhalb des privaten Sektors und ihre strafrechtliche Kontrolle 
durch § 299 StGB (PhD, Bucerius Law-School, Hamburg 2005 [in print]) pp 232 ff. 
101 See detailed above pp 17 ff. 
102 Helmut Heinrichs in Palandt Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch 64ed (München, 2005) Einf v 
§ 116 Rn 1 ff. 
concrete transaction in question is not required for the declaration of intention to be 
effective.103
 
Consequently, with regard to corruption already the actus reus (eg the offering, demanding, 
agreeing to give or receive and the giving or receiving of a bribe) contains the expressive or 
tacit declaration of intention by the briber, the bribee or both to conclude an illegal exchange 
contract of a bribe for a decision. Thus, the mens rea only requires the intention to utter the 
aforementioned declaration of intention comparable with the intention to act and the 
intention of stating something of legal consequence in the civil law. However, according to 
this concept, the mens rea does not additionally require the intention to indeed perform 
(bribee) or induce (briber) a certain corruptly influenced decision in the sense of an offence 
with ‘incongruent mens rea’104 or a ‘double intention’105, which might be comparable to the 
intention underlying a transaction in the civil law. Instead, the mens rea solely relates to the 
actus reus, ie to the expressive or implied offer of or demand for a bribe as counter-
performance for a certain decision of the agent. This link might impliedly even been made 
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103 Helmut Heinrichs (note 102) Einf v § 116 Rn 17. 
104 See above pp 24, 31. 
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This comprehension of the relation between the actus reus and the mens rea has the 
advantage that it eases the burden of proof for the state without establishing presumptions106 
and it excludes the defence of mental reservation, eg the plea that the perpetrator in 
accepting or offering the benefit did not in fact intent to perform or induce a corrupt decision 
at a later stage.107 An accused could otherwise, for instance, successfully defend his conduct 
by pleading that he only offered or demanded a bribe in order to ‘test’ the other person’s 
integrity and, if necessary, would have reported him to the police. In accordance with this 
view Professor Snyman points out in respect of the Corruption Act 94 of 1992 that such 
appearance shall not constitute a valid defence.108 However, this view is not consistent with 
the requirement of a ‘double intention’ regarding (1) the giving or receiving of a bribe and 
(2) the undue interference with the decision, which, according to Professor Snyman, also 
requires intention with regard to the performance of any act or omission by the agent.109  
 
The proposal to comprehend the relation of the actus reus and mens rea of corruption in 
accordance with the objective and subjective parts of declarations of intention in the civil 
law should, in view of the aforementioned advantages, therefore be given preference for the 
purpose of the interpretation of the ruling law and the design of new laws. 
IV. An evaluation of the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 
Against the background of the findings on the actual structure of corruption and the 
challenges arising from this structure for the criminal law, the PCCAA will now be analysed 
and commented in depth. Firstly, the historical background of the PCCAA will be described 
briefly. Secondly, general aspects of the Act will be assessed. Thirdly, it will be evaluated 
how the PCCAA copes with the aforementioned general technical challenges for laws 
against corruption.110 Fourthly, each individual offence as well as certain miscellaneous 
provisions of the Act will be commented. Finally, various shortcomings of the PCCAA will 
be mentioned. 
1. The historical background of the PCCAA 
Corruption was already penalised by the Roman law with regard to public officials and 
subsequently found its way from there via the Roman-Dutch law into South African law in 
 
106 See eg section 24 of the PCCAA that, basically, allows the inference that a benefit was the counter-
performance for corrupt behaviour, if the benefit cannot be linked to a legal purpose. See detailed below 
pp 60 ff. 
107 See in this regard Van der Westhuizen 1974 4 SA 61 (C) 63B. 
108 CR Snyman (note 16) 385. 
109 CR Snyman (note 16) 382, 385. 
110 See above pp 19 ff. 
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the form of the common-law crime of bribery.111 However, this common-law crime of 
bribery could only be committed by or in respect of public officials but did not criminalise 
corruption in the field of private commercial relations, possibly because in a simple agrarian 
economy corrupt practices were viewed as part and parcel of the hazards of the market 
place.112 Only when in the early 20th century industry rose and stock companies emerged in 
which the public invested the bribery sanction was extended to cover corruption within 
commercial relations through the Prevention of Corruption Act 4 of 1918.113 This Act was 
subsequently repealed and replaced by the Prevention of Corruption Act 6 of 1958. During 
this period common-law bribery and the statutory law existed side by side and supplemented 
each other.114  
 
However, in 1992 the common-law offence of bribery was repealed – the only instance of a 
repeal of a common-law crime by the South African Legislature – by section 4 of the 
Corruption Act 94 of 1992, which replaced the former with a statutory provision intended to 
penalise corruption in a much wider sense.115 A couple of years after the Corruption Act of 
1992 was promulgated, several role-players responded to an invitation from the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development to provide comment on the practical 
implementation of the Corruption Act and identified several shortcomings. They criticised 
first of all that the Act was not user-friendly and that it is aimed at two persons, namely the 
payer and the receiver of the bribe, but does not cover the “go-between”.116 Various 
proposals were also received relating to the amendment of the Act, which included: (1) the 
common-law crime of bribery should be reinstated and extended to include corruption in the 
private sector, (2) the crime of corruption should be broadened to cover all agents, public or 
private, (3) the Act should apply extraterritorially in order to cover any gifts given or 
received outside our borders and, finally (4) the Act should create a crime when public 
officials are used or manipulated to commit irregularities.117  
 
As a result, the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development introduced the 
Prevention of Corruption Bill in Parliament on 25 April 2002, which aims to give effect to 
 
111 Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 890; D Lambrechts (note 10) at 106. 
112 Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 890. 
113 Ibid. 
114 D Lambrechts (note 10) at 106. 
115 Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 891. 
116 See Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Combating Corruption in South Africa’ sub 2.2 Legislative Reform, 
http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2004/appendices/040825combating.htm (accessed 10.8.2005). 
117 Ibid. 
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the recommendations that emanated from a total review of the Corruption Act of 1992. The 
underlying concept is to create a comprehensive Prevention of Corruption Bill rather than to 
amend the present Act on a piece-meal basis.118 Additionally, the new anti-corruption 
legislation was designed to give effect to the obligations of South Africa as a party to the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption adopted by the General Assembly on 31 
October 2003.119 The Act must also be seen in the broader legislative context of the 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act No. 121 of 1998 and the Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act No. 38 of 2001, which likewise aim at combating typical forms of ‘white-collar’-crimes. 
 
The Prevention of Corruption Bill was finally enacted and came into force on 27 April of 
2004 as the PCCAA. The Act follows the trend of the so-called ‘unbundling’ in modern 
international legislation and apparently reinstates the common-law crime of bribery as it 
repealed the Corruption Act 94 of 1992, which itself had repealed the common-law crime of 
bribery. These two aspects will subsequently be discussed more in depth. 
2. General aspects of the PCCAA 
Following, various general aspects of the PCCAA, particularly the reinstatement of the 
common-law crime of bribery, the structure of the Act and its strategy of ‘unbundling’ and 
the common structure of the individual offences will be dealt with. 
a) The reinstatement of the common law offence of bribery 
As aforementioned the PCCAA repealed the Corruption Act 94 of 1992, which then had 
repealed the common-law crime of bribery. Although the PCCAA does not contain a 
specific reinstatement of bribery, the logical inference is that the repeal of an Act that 
repealed the common-law must reinstate the common-law crime of bribery.120
 
However, Lambrechts points out that sections 12(2)(a) of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 
provides: ‘Where a law repeals any other law, then unless the contrary intention appears, the 
repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes 
effect […]’. Lambrechts further emphasises that the PCCAA does not contain any indication 
that the common-law crime of bribery has been revived and claims that, on the contrary, 
 
118 Ibid. 
119 Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 892. 
120 Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 891. 
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section 10 of the PCCAA was in essence a replacement of the common-law crime of 
bribery, which had, in effect, usurped the latter.121
 
These arguments must be rejected, because Lambrechts overlooks that section 12(2)(a) of 
the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 does not require that the ‘contrary intention’ of the 
legislature must be explicitly appear in the wording of the Act in question. With regard to 
the PCCAA it must be emphasised that the intention of the legislature to revive the 
common-law crime of bribery was unequivocal. This follows from section 22 of the 
Prevention of Corruption Bill122 which clearly stipulates that ‘the common law crime of 
bribery […] is hereby reinstated’. Additionally, numerous statements made during the 
legislation process indicate the same intention.123 Subsequently, it will be analysed whether 
the reinstated common-law offence of bribery fits into the broader system of the PCCAA. 
b) An overview of the structure of the PCCAA 
The PCCAA is a piece of legislation that is indeed ‘awesome in its extent’124. While the 
now repealed Corruption Act of 1992 consisted of only five sections, the new Act consists 
of 37 rather explicit sections, which is indeed ‘a clear indication that the intention of the 
legislature was to increase its scope’125. The German StGB has, in comparison, only seven 
sections concerning corruption in the public (§§ 108b, 108e, 331-334 StGB) as well as in the 
private sector (§ 299 StGB).126
 
The PCCAA is subdivided in seven chapters. While the first chapter merely contains 
definitions and interpretations, the second chapter clearly is the heart of the Act as it 
contains a general offence of corruption (section 3) and several specific, ‘unbundled’ 
 
121 D Lambrechts (note 10) at 106 f. 
122 Published in Government Gazette No. 23336 on 18 April 2002. 
123 See meeting of the Security and Constitutional Affairs Select Committee on 11 February 2004, voting on 
the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Bill available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=3869 (accessed 23 March 2005); Summary of the Public 
Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2003/appendices/SAGOVT.htm (accessed 
23 March 2005); Meeting of the Justice and Constitutional Development Portfolio Committee on 24 
November 2003 available at http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=3484 (accessed 23 March 2005); 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group ‘Combating Corruption in South Africa’ (note 116); Explanatory 
Memorandum: Prevention of Corruption Bill, Recommendations by the Director of Public Prosecutions: 
Witwatersrand Local Division available at http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2002/appendices/ 
020422memo.htm (accessed 10 August 2005); Statement by G Nel, Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development available at http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=3834 (accessed 
10 August 2005); Institute for Security Studies ‘Programme of the Anti-Corruption Strategies Seminar on 
29-30 November 2004 in Pretoria’ at 2. 
124 Lisa Swaine ‘Corruption: potentially terrifying Consequences’ (2005) 5 Without Prejudice 22 at 22. 
125 D Lambrechts (note 10) at 107. 
126 See Appendix, p 68. 
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offences (sections 4-19). Sections 4-9 relate to specific persons (public officers, foreign 
public officials, agents, members of the legislative authority, judicial officers and members 
of the prosecution authority), section 10 relates to unauthorised gratifications and sections 
11-16 relates to specific matters (witnesses, contracts, auctions, sporting events and 
gambling games and games of chance). Furthermore, section 17-19 (part 5) constitutes 
miscellaneous offences relating to public officers holding interests in business relations of 
the public body, unacceptable conduct relating to witnesses and the obstruction of 
investigations. 
 
Chapter three gives the National Director of Public Prosecutions the competence to 
investigate a person and his property if that person maintains a disproportional standard of 
living or possesses disproportional (‘unexplained’) wealth. Chapter four, above all, 
establishes a presumption that basically allows the inference that a benefit given to another 
was the counter-performance for corrupt behaviour, if it cannot be linked to any legal 
purpose. The penalties for the offences and the establishment of a register for convicted 
persons and their enterprises are laid down in chapter five and six. Finally, chapter seven 
rules miscellaneous matters, above all it imposes a duty to report corrupt transactions on 
certain persons with authority, who can even be held criminally liable for violations and 
establishes extraterritorial jurisdiction under certain conditions. 
c) The strategy of ‘unbundling’ 
The PCCAA ‘unbundles’ the crime of corruption by creating a broad all-encompassing 
offence of corruption and criminalising specific corrupt activities in various spheres of 
life.127 The strategy of ‘unbundling’ generally deserves approval, because it allows 
designing specific offences in accordance with the practical needs of corrupt conduct in 
various spheres of life. Particularly, it is possible to fix the illegality of the exchange 
between the briber and the bribee much more precisely than a general offence would 
allow.128
 
However, the realisation of this strategy by the PCCAA deserves some critique. At first, the 
creation of a general offence of corruption in addition to specific offences is highly 
problematic, because such an offence runs the risk of being critically vague and its 
application depends to an undue extent on the discretion of the judge. In this regard a 
 
127 Lisa Swaine (note 124) at 22. 
128 See with regard to the challenge of fixing the illegality of the exchange pp 19 ff. 
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German scholar pointed out: ‘The attempt to formulate a general offence combating offence 
is hopeless: such an offence would merely protect the public morality’129 Such a ‘catch all-
offence’130 also runs the risk of closing intended gaps of the specific offences. Furthermore, 
the PCCAA transforms the strategy of ‘unbundling’ only half-heartedly as a number of 
specific offences, namely sections 4(2), 5(2), 7(2), 8(2), 9(2), include the general and rather 
vague definition of corrupt behaviour as stipulated by section 3(i)-(iv).131 As this allows 
convicting a person ‘through the back door’ by recourse to the general definition of corrupt 
behaviour within the context of a specific offence, even if the perpetrator has not violated 
any specific duties, the PCCAA’s strategy of ‘unbundling’ is thwarted. 
 
Furthermore, the systematic relation among the specific offences appears to be not fully 
consistent, because certain offences relating to specific persons and matters partially 
overlap, which is not desirable, because it complicates the application of the Act. At first, 
the reinstatement of the common-law crime of bribery appears to be superfluous in view of 
the specific offences, the ‘catch-all’-offence of section 3 and section 10 (unauthorised 
gratifications), which ‘has, in effect, usurped the common law crime of bribery’132. As these 
statutory offences of the PCCAA already cover any imaginable form of corruption, there is 
no need for the reinstatement of the common-law crime of bribery. 
 
Furthermore, it is far from clear, why there is any need for the general offence of corruption 
as stipulated by section 3 in addition to section 6, which covers all agents and thus likewise 
provides a general offence of corruption. Consequently, sections 3, 4, 6, 10, 12, 13 of the 
PCCAA on the one hand overlap partially with each other and on the other hand overlap 
with the common-law crime of bribery. If, for instance, the mayor of a city is bribed by a 
construction company in order to promote a contract to the latter, the common-law crime of 
bribery as well as section 3, 4, 6 (any ‘public official’ is also an ‘agent’ of the state) and 
section 12 of the PCCAA would be fulfilled. This impacts negatively on the user-
friendliness of the PCCAA and shows that the Act has pushed the generally laudable 
strategy of ‘unbundling’ too far. 
 
 
129 See Klaus Volk ‘Diskussionsbeitrag’ in Deutscher Juristentag (ed) Verhandlungen des 61. Deutschen 
Juristentages. Karlsruhe 1996. Band II/2. Sitzungsberichte – Diskussion und Beschlussfassung (München, 
1996) L 105 at 105 f. 
130 Maryann Middleton ‘No Escape from the Imperative to blow the Whistle’ (2004) 4 Without Prejudice 21 at 
21. 
131 See for a detailed analysis of this definition below pp 39 ff. 
132 D Lambrechts (note 10) at 107. 
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d) The common structure of the offences 
The majority of the offences as stipulated by Chapter 2 of the PCCAA (namely sections 3, 4, 
6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 15, 16) share a common structure, which rules in its subsections (a) the 
conduct of the bribee and in its subsections (b) the conduct of the briber with regard to the 
bribe, ie the demanding, accepting, offering, giving etc. of gratifications. The wording 
continues as follows: 
 
“in order to act, personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a manner — 
(aa) that amounts to the illegal […] exercise, carrying out or performance of any powers, 
duties or functions […]” 
 
This legislative approach is not recommendable, because the equivocal conjunction ‘in 
order to’ gives the impression that subsection (aa) either exclusively relates to the previous 
subsection (b), which refers to the briber, or that it relates to subsection (a), which refers to 
the bribee and likewise subsection (b). However, against the background that corruption 
basically means that a decision or certain behaviour of an agent is ‘bought’,133 both 
interpretations do not make sense, because the “illegal exercise […] of any powers, duties 
or functions” can consequently solely refer to the (targeted or promised) behaviour of the 
bribed agent (to subsection (a)). 
 
This legislative approach thus fails to choose a precise, unequivocal formulation of the law, 
which is particularly important in the field of criminal law. This aim can easily be reached 
by splitting the offences in two subsections that relate separately to the bribee and the briber 
as the Corruption Act 94 of 1992 and the German StGB do.134
3. The dealing of the PCCAA with the technical challenges for laws combating 
corruption 
Next it will be examined how the PCCAA deals with the above mentioned technical 
challenges for laws combating corruption.135
a) The approach of the PCCAA to fix the illegality of the corrupt exchange 
In order to comprehend the approach of the PCCAA to fix the illegality of the corrupt 
exchange the recurring formulation used in most of its offences, which is ‘more or less a 
 
133 See above pp 17 ff. 
134 See for instance section 1 of the Corruption Act 94 of 1992 and §§ 299, 331-335 StGB (Appendix, p. 68). 
135 See above pp 17 ff. 
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repetition of section 1 of the now repealed Corruption Act 94 of 1992’136 and which 
describes the bribee’s counter-performance, is of central meaning. This formulation reads as 
follows:  
 
‘[…] in order to act, personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a manner — 
(i) that amounts to the— 
(aa) illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete, or biased; or  
(bb) misuse or selling of information or material acquired in the course of the, 
exercise, carrying out or performance of any powers, duties or functions arising 
out of a constitutional, statutory, contractual or any other legal obligation; 
(ii) that amounts to— 
(aa) the abuse of a position of authority; 
(bb) a breach of trust; or 
(cc) the violation of a legal duty or a set of rules; 
(iii) designed to achieve an unjustified result; or 
(iv) that amounts to any other unauthorised or improper inducement to do or not do 
anything, 
is guilty of the offence of corruption.’ 
 
At first, it must be emphasised that the initial phrase ‘in order to’ makes clear that the 
subsequently described behaviour of the bribee must only be part of the offer, demand or 
agreement of the briber, bribee or both respectively, but it is not required to be performed 
indeed.137
 
With regard to the first subsection (b)(i) it must be said that its reference to ‘the exercise, 
carrying out or performance of any powers, duties or functions arising out of a 
constitutional, statutory, contractual or any other legal obligation’ generally deserves 
approval as it practically includes any principal-agent-relation that might be affected by 
corruption. It also refers to any applicable source of law as it includes the violation of 
‘exterior’ (‘constitutional’ and ‘statutory’) as well as ‘interior’ (‘contractual’) rules in order 
to fix the illegality of the exchange,138 because it refers, inter alia, to statutory and 
contractual obligations. However, this formulation also deserves critique, because many 
 
136 D Lambrechts (note 10) at 110. 
137 See further section 25(a), (b) of the PCCAA, which explicitly rule out defences regarding this matter. 
138 See above pp 19 ff. 
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constitutional, statutory, contractual or other legal obligations do not deal in any sense with 
the delegation of tasks and authority from a principal to an agent. The ‘illegal, dishonest, 
unauthorised, incomplete, or biased’ exercise, etc. of such ‘power’, ‘duty’, ‘function’ or 
‘obligation’ as stipulated by subsection (b)(i)(aa) also overlaps perfectly with ‘the violation 
of a legal duty or a set of rules’ as stipulated by subsection (b)(ii)(cc).  
 
Furthermore, both formulations are problematic and too broad, because they fail to restrict 
the violation of the duty to principal-agent-conflicts. It is, for instance, also a statutory 
obligation or duty under road traffic regulations not to exceed the maximum passenger 
capacity of cars. Consequently, a hitchhiker who persuades the driver of an already fully 
occupied car to give him a lift by offering him to pay a share of the fuel would be liable for 
corruption, because this represents a ‘gratification’ given with the aim to make the driver 
‘violate a legal duty’. Against the background that the nature of corruption is a special 
principal-agent-conflict139 and in view of the fact that the said driver is exclusively 
responsible to himself, this result appears to be highly doubtful and such an offence is, in 
view of the existing liability for the violation of road traffic violations, also superfluous. 
 
Subsection (b)(i)(bb) deserves, on the contrary, unreserved approval, because it requires that 
the information or the material which is ‘misused’ or ‘sold’ must be acquired ‘in the course 
of’ the aforementioned powers, duties, functions or duties. The same applies to subsection 
(b)(ii)(aa) provided that one interprets ‘position of authority’ in the sense that it relates to 
agents who posses a power of authority granted by their principals. Subsection (b)(ii)(bb) 
impliedly requires such a duty of loyalty to a principal, but appears to be a superfluous 
offence, because breach of trust and respectively incitement to the latter is already a criminal 
offence. 
 
Subsection (b)(iii), which describes the manner in which the bribee is supposed to act as 
‘designed to achieve an unjustified result’, is also problematic. At first, the formulation 
‘unjustified result’ is critically vague and grants any judge an undue discretion, which 
allows punishing not only illegal, but also mere immoral behaviour. For instance, a guest of 
a restaurant who gives a tip to the waiter while he waits to be seated in order to get a certain 
table, which is already reserved, would be liable to corruption in terms of section 3(b)(iii) 
and 6(b)(ii) of the PCCAA. Although the waiter is acting as an agent of the owner of the 
 
139 See above pp 9 ff. 
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restaurant and this case is in principle similar to serious and punishable forms of corruption, 
it appears doubtful whether such conduct indeed represents criminal behaviour. 
 
Finally, subsection (b)(iv) appears to be completely failed as it constitutes an offence, if ‘any 
person [the bribee] accepts […] any gratification from any other person in order to act, 
personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a manner that amounts to any other 
unauthorised or improper inducement to do or not do anything’. As the behaviour of the 
bribee must amount to an ‘unauthorised or improper inducement’, this means, logically, that 
a third person must be induced by the bribee ‘to do or not do to anything’, which does not 
make much sense. However, it appears that this was not the intention of the legislature, but 
is instead a result of the structure of the offences, which do not rule the criminalised conduct 
separately for the briber and the bribee.140 It is in any cases remarkable that only the 
‘inducement’, but not the actual behaviour of the third person is required to be 
‘unauthorised’ or ’improper’, but that on the contrary, any behaviour or omission is 
sufficient. 
 
Altogether, it is a merit of the PCCAA that it refers to different sources of law 
(‘constitutional, statutory, contractual or any other legal obligations’) and that it tries to 
specify the corrupt behaviour of the bribee. In comparison, §§ 332, 334 of the German 
StGB, which relate to corrupt activities of public officials, only stipulate that the public 
official must violate an official duty.141 However, it is a major flaw of the PCCAA that it 
fails to restrict the circle of duties in question to such duties, which derive from the 
relationship between the agent and his principal. Furthermore, terms like, for instance, 
‘unjustified result’ are critically vague as they extend corruption beyond illegal exchanges to 
mere contraventions of the public moral.  
 
In comparison, the definition of ‘corruptly’ as stipulated by section 1(iv) of the Prevention 
of Corruption Bill was significantly shorter and more precise: 
 
‘“corruptly” means in contravention of or against the spirit of any law, provision, rule, 
procedure, process, system, policy, practice, directive, order or any other term or condition 
pertaining to— 
(a) any employment relationship; 
 
140 See above p 39. 
141 See Appendix, p 68. 
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(b) any sporting event; 
(c) any agreement; or 
(d) the performance of any function in whatever capacity.’ 
b) The approach of the PCCAA to criminalise ‘material attempts’ 
The approach of the PCCAA to criminalise ‘material attempts’ as ‘formal’ completed 
offences142 deserves unreserved approval. The PCCAA covers not only bilateral agreements 
between the briber and the bribee to commit an offence of corruption and the factual giving 
or receiving of a bribe, but furthermore, by virtue of the interpretations stipulated in section 
2(3)(a), inter alia, the demanding of a bribe and offering of a bribe respectively. In 
comparison, §§ 299, 331-334 StGB similarly cover the demanding (‘fordern’), agreeing to 
receive (‘versprechen lassen’) or receiving (‘annehmen’) of a bribe by the bribee or the 
offering (‘anbieten’), promising (‘versprechen’) or giving (‘gewähren’) of a bribe by the 
briber respectively. 
c) The approach of the PCCAA to criminalise the contacting-phase 
Any offence of the PCCAA requires some sort of counter-performance by the bribee and 
thus there is no offence that immediately aims at combating the practice of ‘feeding’, where 
the agent performs no counter-performance at all. However, section 10 of the PCCAA 
relates to unauthorised gratifications given to parties to an employment relationship and 
eases the requirements concerning the counter-performance of the bribee. As the approach 
of section 10 to combat ‘feeding’ also concerns its exact scope, this matter will be dealt with 
comprehensively below.143
d) The approach of the PCCAA to avoid undesirable loopholes 
The PCCAA deals convincingly with the practice that bribes are often given to third persons 
in order to camouflage corrupt activities,144 because any of its offences contains the wording 
‘whether for the benefit of himself or herself [the bribee] or for the benefit of another person 
[e.g. a spouse]’ or ‘whether for the benefit of that person [the bribee] or another person [e.g. 
a spouse]’ respectively. This formulation almost completely equates to the wording of the 
offences as stipulated by the German StGB, which also cover bribes that are demanded, 
agreed or given for the benefit of the briber or for the benefit of a third person.145
 
 
142 See above pp 22 ff. 
143 See below pp 51 ff. 
144 See above pp 14(sketch 3), 29. 
145 See Appendix, p 68. 
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The PCCAA further deals comprehensively with the frequent use of intermediaries146 as any 
of its offences includes gratifications received from ‘any person’ in respect of the bribee, 
which includes such received from a middleman. In respect of the briber the PCCAA further 
covers gratifications given ’whether for the benefit of that person [the bribee] or another 
person, in order to act, personally or by influencing another person so to act […]’, which 
includes bribes given to the bribee via an intermediary. 
e) The approach of the PCCAA to tackle problems regarding the mens rea 
While the general definition of corruption as stipulated by the Corruption Act 94 of 1992 
made specific reference to intention, section 3 as well as the specific offences of the PCCAA 
do not specifically refer to intention but instead use the words ‘in order to act’.147 As these 
words ordinarily mean ‘with a view to’ or ‘for the purpose of’, this wording implies indeed 
dolus directus to induce (briber) or perform (bribee) a corruptly influenced decision.148  
 
Furthermore, the PCCAA follows the concept of ‘double intention’ or ‘incongruent mens 
rea’149, which means that the intention must relate (1) to the giving or receiving of the 
gratification and (2) to a future corruptly influenced decision. This follows by an 
argumentum e contrario from the existence of section 25(b), which expressively excludes 
the defence that the bribee accepted the gratification without intending to perform the act in 
relation to which the gratification was given. If the PCCAA followed the alternative 
legislative concept, which does not require a ‘double intention’, there would be no need for 
the provision of section 25(b), because this legal consequence would already result from 
general rules due to a lack of ‘double intention’ or ‘incongruent mens rea’, for instance, if a 
perpetrator credibly pleaded that he merely wanted to ‘test’ the other part.150
 
The PCCAA thus fails to give preference to the alternative legislative approach in respect of 
the structure of the actus reus and mens rea, which is based on the fact, that corruption is the 
conclusion, or at least the attempt respectively, of an illegal exchange contract between the 
briber and the bribee.151 The actus reus and mens rea should therefore instead be designed 
in accordance with the objective and subjective parts of declarations of intention in the civil 
law, in order to bring about a relaxation of proof and in order to rule out the defence of 
 
146 See above pp 15 (sketch 4), 29. 
147 Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 893. 
148 Ibid. 
149 See above pp 22 ff, 31 ff. 
150 See above p 33. 
151 See above pp 39 ff. 
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mental reservation.152 Furthermore, this concept also fits better with the factual conduct of 
corruption, because the proposed or agreed link between the bribe and the particular 
decision is, logically, even if it is only uttered impliedly, an element of the actus reus. 
4. An evaluation of the offences and miscellaneous provisions of the PCCAA 
The following evaluation of the PCCAA will firstly focus on commenting on its most 
important offences within a comparative consideration of the approach of the German StGB. 
Afterwards, miscellaneous provisions of the PCCAA, for instance the duty to report corrupt 
activities, will be dealt with. 
a) An evaluation of the offences of the PCCAA 
Following, the general offence of corruption (section 3), the offences relating to specific 
persons (sections 4-9), the offence relating to unauthorised gratifications (section 10), the 
offences relating to specific matters (sections 11-16) and the miscellaneous offences of the 
Act (sections 17-19) will be evaluated. The restriction of the evaluation to these offences 
appeared in view of the great extent of the PCCAA inevitable and at the same time 
appropriate, because the aforementioned offences of the Act have the greatest practical 
relevance. 
aa) Section 3: general offence of corruption 
It was already mentioned that the establishment of a general offence of corruption is very 
problematic. Firstly, such an offence indeed runs the risk of ‘merely protecting the public 
morality’153. Secondly, in respect of the PCCAA, a general offence of corruption might 
close intended gaps of its specific offences ‘through the back door’.154
 
With regard to the corrupt behaviour of the bribee, which is stipulated by subsections (i)-
(iii), it can be referred to the explanations made above to a large extent as most of the 
specific offences have this formulation in common.155 This formulation is partially critically 
vague and too broad, particularly because section 3 does not require a principle-agent-
relation. It must be emphasised that the Justice and Constitutional Development Portfolio 
Committee also raised concerns in this respect, because the Chair considered that 
subsection (b)(i) ‘should be restricted as it is very widely formulated and could thus be 
 
152 See above pp 31 ff. 
153 See Klaus Volk ‘Referat’ in Deutscher Juristentag (ed) Verhandlungen des 61. Deutschen Juristentages. 
Karlsruhe 1996. Band II/1 (Sitzungsberichte – Referate und Beschlüsse (München, 1996) L 35  at L 50; 
Klaus Volk (note 129) at L 105 f. 
154 See above p 37. 
155 See above pp 39 ff 
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interpreted to include every relation instead of only those of a statutory or contractual 
nature’.156 The questionable result is, for instance, that any person that receives a benefit for 
the perpetration of an offence (eg an ordered murder) is not only liable for this offence, but 
liable for corruption in terms of section 3 of the PCCAA as well. 
bb) Section 4: corrupt activities relating to public officers 
Section 4 of the PCCAA is of great practical relevance as it covers corrupt activities relating 
to public officers, which include, by reference to section 1(xxiii), practically any person 
within the public service. This offence criminalises the demand for, receiving of or 
agreement to receive a bribe by a public officer as well as equivalent conduct of the briber in 
respect of certain behaviour of the former. Section 4 then describes the corrupt behaviour of 
the public officer by repeating the wording of section 3 (i)-(iv), which is regrettable, because 
the reference to this broad and rather vague definition thwarts the attempt to specify this 
definition through ‘unbundling’.157 Furthermore, subsection (2) specifies this behaviour in 
respect of the peculiarities of the public service, including, inter alia, the ‘voting at any 
meeting of a public body’ and ‘the aiding assisting or favouring any particular person in the 
transaction of any business with a public body’. 
 
These concretisations deserve almost unreserved approval as they guarantee the meeting of 
the constitutional requirements of clarity and definiteness regarding criminal offences. 
However, section 4 (2)(b) criminalises the mere ‘performing […] of any official functions’ 
against a gratification. This appears to be unsystematic as it is the only reference of section 4 
to completely legal conduct of the public officer. It must be emphasised that there can be no 
doubt that any link between a gratification given to a public officer in respect of the 
performance of his duties threatens the integrity of the public service and thus should be 
punished. Nevertheless, there is a substantial difference between the legal and illegal 
performance of such duties, which should be considered by a statutory mitigation of the 
sentence. The German StGB, for instance, pays due consideration to this circumstance in 
that it differentiates between bribes given in respect of the legal performance of official 
duties (§§ 331, 333 StGB, so-called ‘Vorteilsannahme’ [acceptance of benefits] and 
‘Vorteilsgewährung’ [granting of benefits]) and a violation of duties (§§ 332, 334 StGB, so-
 
156 See Deliberations of the Justice and Constitutional Development Portfolio Committee on 18 November 
2003 available at http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute/php.?id=3458 (accessed 5 August 2005). 
157 See above pp 37, 39 ff, 45. 
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called ‘Bestechlichkeit’ [corruptibility] and ‘Bestechung’ [corruption]) as an aggravating 
circumstance.158
cc) Section 5: corrupt activities relating to foreign public officers 
Section 5, which criminalises bribing of foreign public officers, gives effect to the 
obligations of South Africa deriving from the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions adopted by South Africa at 
the OECD on 21 November 1997.159 Although the establishment of this offence is certainly 
useful, it is puzzling, why it specifies the corrupt behaviour of the public official deviating 
from section 4(2) and why it exclusively criminalises the briber. This restriction is 
incomprehensible as section 35 establishes extraterritorial jurisdiction under certain 
conditions and thus generally allows convicting foreign citizens. However, a reason for a 
differentiation between foreign public officers and foreign citizens is not apparent. 
dd) Section 6: corrupt activities relating to agents 
Section 6 criminalises corrupt activities relating to agents and thus covers, by reference to 
section 1(i), the bribing of ‘any authorised representative who acts on behalf of his or her 
principal and includes a director, officer, employee or other person authorised to act on 
behalf of his or her principal, and “agency” has a corresponding meaning’. With regard to 
the corruptly influenced behaviour of the agent, section 6 corresponds to the general offence 
of corruption as stipulated by section 3. The critique made in respect of section 3 and 4 
therefore likewise applies to section 6.160
 
With regard to the circle of qualified perpetrators some aspects of section 6 deserve critique. 
With regard to the briber it is first of all puzzling, why section 6 not only covers ‘any 
person’ (subsection (b)(ii)), but furthermore includes ‘any agent’ (subsection (a)(ii)), 
because ‘any person’ logically includes ‘any agent’. Although the criminalisation of agents 
as bribe-payers deserves unreserved approval as companies often delegate bribing to certain 
employees or external intermediaries, section 6(a)(ii)) is alongside subsection (b)(ii) 
superfluous.  
 
With regard to the bribee even more serious concerns must be expressed concerning the 
qualified perpetrators, because section 6(a)(ii) and (b)(i) criminalise bribes given by an 
 
158 See Appendix, p 68. 
159 See Deliberations of the Justice and Constitutional Development Portfolio Committee (note 156). 
160 See above pp 45 f 
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agent to ‘any other person’. At first, it is puzzling, why section 6 then does not likewise 
cover bribes given by any person to any person, because whether or not the briber is an 
agent does not matter in respect of the injustice. However, more important is that section 6, 
like section 3, therefore extends the liability for ‘corruption’ beyond principal-agent-
conflicts.161 If the hitchhiker in the example given above162 who ‘bribes’ a driver in order to 
get a lift in an already fully occupied car were an agent (eg an employee), section 6(a)(ii) 
and (b)(i) would likewise be fulfilled. 
 
Finally, section 6 must be criticised, because it does not fit into the systematic of the 
PCCAA. As section 6 refers to all agents, which includes public officers as well as 
managers and employees in the private sector, it is actually the ‘real’, general offence of 
corruption and should therefore replace section 3. However, the arguments against such a 
‘catch-all’-offence alongside several specific offences, ie the closing of intended gaps, 
equally apply in respect of section 6.  
ee) Section 7: corrupt activities relating to members of legislative authority 
Corruption in relation to members of the legislative authority is also a widespread 
phenomenon,163 and it thus deserves approval that section 7 is specifically designed to tackle 
this problem. In order to serve this purpose, section 7 on the one hand integrates the 
common description of corrupt behaviour as stipulated by section 3 (i)-(iv), and on the other 
hand enumerates in subsection (2) certain conduct of the bribee as counter-performance for 
the bribe, which is specifically designed in respect of members of the legislative authority. 
This conduct includes: 
 
(a) absenting himself or herself from; 
(b) voting at any meeting of; 
(c) aiding or assisting in procuring or preventing the passing of any vote in; 
(d) exerting any improper influence over the decision making of any person performing his 
or her functions as a member of; or 
(e) influencing in any way, the election, designation or appointment of any functionary to be 
elected, designated or appointed by;  
 
161 See above pp 40 ff. 
162 See above p 41. 
163 See above p 6. 
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the legislative authority of which he or she is a member or of any committee or joint 
committee of that legislative authority. 
 
The scope of section 7 deserves unreserved approval, because it properly covers typical 
forms of corruption that affect the proper functioning of the legislative, particularly through 
so-called ‘lobbying’. Section 7 has the merit that it extends the liability beyond the mere 
buying of votes in a final voting on a law in parliament, to ‘committees or joint committees 
of that legislative authority’. The practical importance of this extension cannot be 
overestimated, because the major target for lobbyism is already the drafting of new laws in 
parliamentary committees. The reason, why lobby-groups predominantly aim at this early 
stage of the legislation-process is that only at this stage they either are able to influence the 
exact shape of the law or even prevent the law from being proceeded to parliament at all.  
 
On the contrary, § 108e StGB (‘Abgeordnetenbestechung’ [bribing of Members of 
Parliament]) of the German StGB solely criminalises the bribing of delegates of the 
European Parliament or any parliament of the German federation or a province in respect of 
their voting in parliament but fails to relate to parliamentary committees and thus shows a 
serious loophole.164
ff) Section 8: corrupt activities relating to judicial officers 
As mentioned above corruption can naturally also affect the judiciary165 and consequently 
the criminal law has a duty to tackle this phenomenon. Section 8 of the PCCAA covers 
corrupt activities relating to judicial officers, which includes, by reference to section 1(xi) 
practically any judge and adjudicator. Section 8 describes the corrupt behaviour of the 
judicial officer on the one hand in accordance with the general definition of section 3(i)-(iv) 
and on the other hand as specified by section 8(2). Thus, section 8 of the PCCAA also 
suffers from the common disadvantage of most of its specific offences in that the general 
definition of their subsections (i)-(iv) levels the sharp outline of their subsection (2). 
Section 8(2) reads as follows: 
 
Without derogating from the generality of section 2(4), “to act” in subsection (1) includes— 
(a)  performing or not adequately performing a judicial function; 
 
164 See Appendix, p 68. 
165 See above p 6. 
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(b)  making decisions affecting life, freedoms, rights, duties, obligations and property of 
persons; 
(c) delaying, hindering or preventing the performance of a judicial function; 
(d)  aiding, assisting or favouring an particular person in conducting judicial proceedings or  
 judicial functions; 
(e)  showing any favour or disfavour to any person in the performance of a judicial function;  
 or 
(f) exerting any improper influence over the decision making of any person, including 
another judicial officer or a member of the prosecuting authority, performing his or her 
official functions. 
 
This enumeration covers comprehensively any form of corrupt activity that might occur in 
respect of judicial officers. However, section 8(2)(a) and (b) also criminalise the mere 
‘performing […] of a judicial function’  or ‘making of decisions affecting life […] of other 
persons’ respectively, which includes completely lawful conduct. Thus section 8(2) (like 
section 4(2)) equates completely legal conduct with the illegal conduct as described in the 
remaining subsections instead of stipulating a statutory mitigation of punishment.166
gg) Section 9: corrupt activities relating to members of the prosecuting authority 
As section 9, which relates to members of the prosecuting authority, is quite similarly 
designed like section 8, it presents basically the same preferences and weaknesses as the 
latter. On the one hand section 9(2) deals convincingly with specific forms of corrupt 
behaviour relating to members of the prosecuting authority, for instance the delaying of a 
prosecutorial function (section 9(2)(b)). On the other hand section 9(1) also integrates the 
general description of corrupt behaviour as stipulated by section 3 and its subsection (2)(a) 
also equates the legal performing of prosecutorial functions with the illegal performance of 
such duties. Finally, one must consider that section 24(2) provides a useful presumption 
regarding the mens rea. If for example a prosecutor is charged with an offence involving the 
acceptance of a gratification arising from the arrest of any person for an alleged offence, it is 





166 See above p 46. 
167 See in respect of the presumptions also below p 60. 
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hh) Section 10: unauthorised gratification by or to party in an employment relationship 
The offence of receiving or offering unauthorised gratifications of section 10 is an offence 
sui generi in comparison to the other offences of the act, which is already indicated by the 
fact that it is situated separately in part 3 of the PCCAA. Section 10 relates to any person 
who is party to an employment relationship, which includes, by reference to section 1(xvii), 
‘any person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an 
employer’. The broadness of this definition thus includes employees in the public as well as 
in the private sector.168  
 
Section 10 describes the counter-performance of the bribee as ‘doing any act in relation to 
the exercise, carrying out or performance of that party’s powers, duties or functions within 
the scope of that party’s employment relationship’. It is quite remarkable that this conduct is 
not required to be illegal and, furthermore, the definition ‘any act’ is extremely broad. 
Consequently, the injustice of this offence predominantly depends on the fact that the 
gratification is ‘unauthorised’.  
 
At first sight, one may assume that the shift to the illegality of the gratification itself 
indicates that section 10 combats the practice of ‘feeding’.169 However, the requirement that 
the employee must ‘do any act’ does not match the practice of ‘feeding’ as the latter lacks 
any reference to a certain decision or behaviour of the agent, but solely aims at testing the 
agent’s general willingness and building up trust.170 Section 10 of the PCCAA therefore 
presents a serious loophole, if a gratification is given, but no behaviour of the employee is 
demanded or performed. This conduct can also not be punished as attempt or conspiracy to 
commit corruption, because it lacks a corresponding mens rea of the feeder in this regard at 
this stage. The wording of section 10 should thus de lege ferenda be modified in order to 
cover the mere receiving or offering of unauthorised gratifications without any counter-
performance. However, it deserves approval that section 10 refers to the authorisation of the 
gratification, because this criterion is best suited to fix the injustice of ‘feeding’.171 §§ 331, 
333 of the German StGB cover such unauthorised gratifications relating to public officers, 
because these offences do not require any concrete official act; however, unauthorised 
 
168  D Lambrechts (note 10) at 110 agrees on this fact (‘[…] the offence created by section 10 also applies to 
persons who are party to an employment relationship in the private sector.’). 
169 See above pp 17 (sketch 5), 22, 25 ff. 
170 See above pp 17, 22. 
171 See above p 28. 
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gratifications in respect of employees in the private sector are unpunished under German 
criminal law.172
ii) Section 11: corrupt activities relating to witnesses and evidential material during 
certain proceedings 
Section 11, which criminalises certain corrupt activities relating to witnesses, presents some 
peculiarities. Firstly, it deviates from the common structure of the offences commented so 
far as its subsections (1) and (2) refer separately to the bribee, i.e. the witness (subsection 1), 
and the briber (subsection 2). This approach must be welcomed as it allows a precise and 
unequivocal formulation of the law.173 However, it is puzzling that the scope of the criminal 
liability of the witness and the briber is not congruent, because only subsection 2(a) 
criminalises the ‘influence, delay or prevent the testimony of that person or another person 
as a witness […]’ while subsection 1 does not contain this variant. An objective reason for 
this differentiation is not apparent. 
 
With regard to the scope of the corruptly influenced behaviour of the witness section 11 
covers any imaginable behaviour which might obstruct the justice system, for instance, any 
influence regarding the testimony of witnesses, the withholding of testimony, records, 
documents, police dockets or other relevant objects, the altering or destruction of such 
evidence or evading legal process summoning that person to appear as a witness. 
Furthermore, section 11 is flanked by section 18, which criminalises undue influence on 
witnesses by intimidation or physical force.174
jj) Section 12: corrupt activities relating to contracts 
Section 12 is of great practical importance as a substantial part of corruption in the public as 
well as in the private sector relates to the promotion and execution of contracts in that public 
officers or employees of companies are rewarded for influencing the award of contract by 
receiving as a ‘kick-back’, a percentage of the contract price.175 However, one must consider 
that in absence of a principal-agent-relationship, corruption logically cannot occur in respect 
of the promotion of contracts through the owner of a close company. Consequently, § 299 of 
 
172 See Appendix, p 68. 
173 See above p 39. 
174 See below p 58. 
175 See above p 7 ff.; Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 889. 
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the German StGB, which covers corruption relating to contracts in the private sector, 
exclusively criminalises bribes given to employees and excludes owners of companies.176
 
Against this background it is puzzling, why section 12(1)(a) extends the scope of this 
offence to ‘any person, who, directly or indirectly accepts […] any gratification […] in 
order to improperly influence [inter alia] the promotion of any contract with a private 
organisation’ and why section 12(1)(b) does so correspondingly in respect of the briber. As 
the definition of ‘gratification’ according to section 1(ix)(j) includes ‘discounts, 
commissions, rebates, bonus, deduction or percentage’, it would for instance constitute 
corruption in terms of section 12, if one supplier persuades the owner of a close company to 
offer a contract to him instead of another supplier by giving a substantial discount. As such 
conduct is completely legal and represents a legitimate business practice, a restriction of 
section 12 to ‘agents’ or ‘employees’ is recommendable. 
 
Furthermore, the ‘blanket clause’-requirement that this conduct must be ‘improperly’, is 
critically vague in order to exclude such legitimate competition from corrupt activities 
reliably and it seems that the legislature did not realise that concerning corruption in the 
private it is crucial to decide whether ‘interior’ or ‘exterior’ rules, ie contractual rules or the 
law on competition, shall be relevant.177 As a result of the vagueness of the definition 
‘improperly’, Section 12(1)(b)(i)(aa) would for instance be fulfilled, if the wife of an 
employee convinced her husband to feign ill and stay away from work by inviting him to an 
expensive dinner. This invitation represents ‘a gratification’ given for the purpose to 
‘improperly influence the execution of any contract with a private organisation, because her 
husband should breach his contractual duty to go to work. However, it is indeed 
questionable whether this conduct is criminal. 
 
Another remarkable aspect of section 12 is that its subsection (1)(a) describes the behaviour 
of the bribee as ‘accepting […] any gratification from any other person, whether for the 
benefit of himself or herself or for the benefit of that other person or of another person’. 
However, the reference to ‘that other person’ makes no sense within the context of 
subsection (1)(a), because it can logically only refer to the previously mentioned giver of the 
 
176 Klaus Tiedemann in Burkhard Jähnke, Heinrich Wilhelm Laufhütte and Walter Odersky (eds) Leipziger 
Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch 11ed (Berlin New, York, 2002) § 299 Rn 13. 
177 See above pp 19 ff. 
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gratification, ie the briber, who can logically not directly benefit from the bribe. This 
formulation thus appears to be a mistake of the legislature. 
 
However, it is an advantage of section 12 in comparison to § 299 of the German StGB, 
which criminalises corruption in relation to contracts in the private sector, that it covers also 
rewards for having acted corruptly in the past. The German law on the other hand presents a 
serious loophole, because it requires a relation of ‘do ut des’ between a bribe and a future 
‘improper favouritism’.178
kk) Section 13: corrupt activities relating to procuring and withdrawal of tenders 
As contracts, particularly such with a substantial contract value, are usually awarded through 
tender-proceedings, these proceedings are naturally often a target for improper influence. 
However, one must distinguish between ‘vertical’ forms of improper influence between a 
tenderer and a decision-maker of the customer, which amount to ordinary forms of 
corruption, and ‘horizontal’ cartel-agreements between several tenderers. 
 
Section 12 of the PCCAA basically covers three different types of illicit conduct relating to 
tenders. Subsection (1)(a)(i) and (2)(a)(i) criminalise any influence aiming at the decision-
maker of the tenderee by the receiving (subsection 1) or giving (subsection 2) of a 
gratification in order to influence the award of a tender. Consequently, section 12 is in 
respect of such ‘vertical’ corrupt activities a speciality of section 12, which relates to 
contracts and deserves unreserved approval. 
 
Subsection (1)(a)(ii) criminalises typical ‘horizontal’ agreements between tenderers, 
particularly so-called ‘protective-offers’. Typically, several or even all tenderers agree on 
which of them shall receive the contract and often also agree on ‘compensation payments’ 
for the remaining tenderers. In order to secure that the fixed tenderer indeed receives the 
contract, the remaining tenderers typically make tenders, so-called ‘protective-offers’, which 
exceed the price offered by the fixed tenderer substantially. Subsection (1)(a)(ii) 
criminalises such agreements adequately with regard to tenderers who receive such 
‘compensation payments’. However, section 13 presents a serious loophole, because such 
‘protective offers’ are sometimes also made without any immediate reward as a ‘favour’ or 
just in the mere hope to be fixed by the cartel as the winner of another tender in the future. 
 
178 See Wolfgang Dannecker in Ulrich Neumann, Ingeborg Puppe and Wolfgang Schild (eds) Nomos 
Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch 1ed (Baden-Baden, 2003) § 299 Rn 36. 
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Such conduct can furthermore not be punished as conspiracy to corrupt in the future as the 
required mens rea will in many cases not be present already.  Section 13 therefore should be 
re-designed in accordance with § 298 (‘Submissionsabsprachen’ [illicit agreements relating 
to tenders]) of the German StGB, which criminalises mere agreements between tenderers 
that aim to make the tenderee accept a particular tender. Furthermore, it is unintelligible, 
why section 13(1)(a)(ii) criminalises such conduct in respect of the bribed tenderer, but fails 
to criminalise the briber correspondingly. 
 
Finally, sections 13(1)(a)(iii) and (2)(b)(i)(ii) criminalise the receiving or giving of 
gratifications in respect of the withdrawal of tenders, which also represents a common form 
of manipulation. However, section 13 fails to criminalise gratifications given as counter-
performance for a complete renunciation by a competitor of making a tender.  
ll) Section 14: corrupt activities relating to auctions 
Section 14 criminalises various corrupt activities relating to auctions, particularly 
gratifications in respect of favouring or prejudging a specific person in the course of the 
bidding process through the auctioneer (section 14(1)(a) and (2)(b)) as well as refraining 
from bidding at an auction or participating in a manner in order to get a specific offer for the 
article or to sell the article at a specific amount or to sell the article at a specific amount or to 
sell the article to a specific bidder (section 14(1)(b); (2)(a) and (c)). 
 
The structure of section 14 is not easy to comprehend at first sight. Section 14(1)(a) covers 
auctioneers who receive gratifications from any other person in order to favour or prejudice 
a specific person in the course of the bidding process or as a reward for acting so and 
subsection (2)(b)) covers ‘any person’ who gives a gratification for this purpose 
correspondingly. 
 
While the aforementioned subsections cover corruption in respect of the auctioneer as the 
bribee, subsections 14(1)(b) and 14(2)(a) correspondingly criminalise gratifications given 
from auctioneers to participants of the bidding process in order to influence that person to 
refrain from bidding or participate in a manner so as to get a specific offer for the article or 
to sell the article at a specific amount or to sell the article to a specific bidder. 
 
Furthermore, section 14(2)(a) also corresponds to subsection (2)(c), which basically extends 
section 14(1)(b) to any person who gives a gratification to a participant of the bidding 
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process in order to influence that person to refrain from bidding or participate in a manner so 
as to get a specific offer for the article or to sell the article at a specific amount or to sell the 
article at a specific amount or to sell the article to a specific bidder. 
 
Section 14 thus covers ‘vertical’ manipulations between the auctioneer and bidders as well 
as ‘horizontal’ manipulations between participants. Although section 14 is carefully drafted 
and all these manipulations might in theory occur, one may wonder at first sight, if there is a 
sufficient practical need to establish a criminal offence, particularly in view of the usual 
transparency of auctions on the one hand and the ‘ultima-ratio’-function of the criminal law 
on the other hand. Especially the bribing of participants of an auction by the auctioneer 
seems to be a highly unlikely scenario, because there is no apparent interest of the latter.  
 
However, a substantial practical need does indeed exist with regard to internet online-
auctions as these auctions lack transparency and are vulnerable to several manipulations. For 
instance the seller of an object might ask friends to participate in the bidding process in 
order to increase the price. Furthermore, the seller might ask one of his friends to buy the 
object on his behalf and return it to him secretly, if it does not achieve a satisfying price. 
mm) Section 15: corrupt activities relating to sporting events 
Within sports the practice of so-called ‘match-fixing’ is quite common in that persons 
betting on the result of sporting events bribe officials and players to influence the outcome 
of the contest.179 As sporting events for many years have been a multi-million-rand 
business, there is a substantial practical need for a corresponding criminal offence. 
 
Section 15 of the PCCAA makes it an offence to accept (subsection (a)) or give (subsection 
(b)) respectively gratifications from any other person in return for (subsection (i)) or as a 
reward for (subsection (ii)) engaging in any act which constitutes a threat to or undermines 
the integrity of any sporting event180, including, in any way, influencing the run of the play 
or the outcome of a sporting event or not reporting such activity to the competent sporting 
body or the nearest police station. Furthermore, section 15(c) criminalises the carrying into 
effect any scheme which constitutes a threat to or undermines the integrity of any sporting 
 
179 See above p 9; Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 889. 
180 ‘Sporting event’ is defined in section 1(xxv) of the PCCAA as ‘any event or contest in any sport, between 
individuals or teams, or in which animals competes, and which is usually attended b the public and is 
governed by rules which include the constitution, rules or code of conduct of any sporting body which 
stages any sporting event or of any regulatory body under whose constitution, rules or code of conduct the 
sporting event is conducted.’ 
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event, including, in any way, influencing the run of the play or the outcome of a sporting 
event. 
 
Section 15 deserves unreserved approval as it covers appropriately typical practices like 
‘match-fixing’ through bribes given to sportsmen or referees by bookmakers or opponent 
teams in return for or as a reward for underperforming. Furthermore, section 15(c) 
criminalises other illicit agreements, particularly ‘horizontal’ agreements between certain 
teams designed to influence the outcome of sporting events without bribes being paid. On 
the contrary, the German StGB does unfortunately not cover corruption in relation to 
sporting events at all. 
nn) Section 16: corrupt activities relating to gambling games or games of chance 
Section 16 of the PCCAA is designed, like section 15, to criminalise exactly the same forms 
of manipulations in respect of gambling games or games of chance.181 In practice, such 
manipulations might for instance occur between gamblers and employees of casinos in that 
they collude to the disadvantage of the casino and share the profits of unjustified winnings. 
oo) Section 17: corrupt activities relating to acquisition of private interest in contract, 
agreement or investment of public body 
Section 17(1) of the PCCAA aims at preventing any public officer from acquiring or holding 
a private interest in any contract, agreement or investment emanating from or connected 
with the public body in which he or she is employed or which is made on account of that 
public body. Due to the absence of a two-person-relationship between a briber and a bribee 
section 17(1) therefore does not criminalise corruption in the actual sense, but covers a 
similar and also quite common form of conflict of interest. However, the scope of 
section 17(1) is subjected to certain exceptions as stipulated by subsection (2). According to 
subsection (2), subsection (1) does not apply, if the public officer is a shareholder of a listed 
company, if his conditions of employment do not prohibit him or her from acquiring or 
holding such interest and, in the case of a tender process, if this process was independent. 
The German StGB, on the contrary, contains no comparable offence in respect of such 




181 According to section 1(vii) of the PCCAA ‘gambling game’ means ‘any gambling game as defined in 
section 1of the National Gambling Act, 1996 (Act No. 33 of 1996)’, while ‘games of chance’ include ‘a 
lottery, lotto, numbers game, scratch game, sweepstake or sports pool’. 
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pp) Section 18: unacceptable conduct relating to witnesses 
Section 18 of the PCCAA criminalises, like section 11, certain conduct that might obstruct 
the justice system, for instance, any influence regarding the testimony of witnesses, the 
withholding of testimony, records, documents, police dockets or other relevant objects, the 
altering or destruction of such evidence or evading legal process summoning that person to 
appear as a witness. However, unlike section 11, which criminalises corrupt influence on 
witnesses, section 18 covers the intimidation, the use of physical force, the improper 
persuasion and coercion of witnesses and certain other persons. Although such conduct 
naturally occurs and unequivocally represents criminal behaviour, it is obvious that it has 
nothing to do with corruption, which is the voluntary exchange of a decision against a 
gratification between an agent and a third person.182 Furthermore, the practical need to 
establish an offence like section 18 appears doubtful as such practices will often be 
punishable as subornation of perjury, physical injury, unlawful compulsion or menace. 
qq) Section 19: intentional interference with, hindering or obstruction of investigation 
of offence 
As corrupt activities are often committed in the course of complicated and lengthy business 
transactions, their proof depends to a great extent on documents and electronic pieces of 
evidence, like E-mails and computer hard drives. Section 19 of the PCCAA pays due 
consideration to this fact, because it criminalises the destruction, altering, mutilation or 
falsifying of such evidence, if committed with the intent to conceal an offence of sections 3-
18 of the PCCAA or in order to hinder or obstruct a law enforcement body in its 
investigation of any such offence. Section 19 therefore represents a useful additional 
measure of the PCCAA in order to guarantee the prosecution and in order to protect civil 
claims, eg by the principal of a corrupt employee or by honest competitors. 
b) Important miscellaneous provisions of the PCCAA 
Hereafter, important miscellaneous provisions of the PCCAA, particularly the competence 
to investigate persons and property relating to corrupt activities (sections 22-23), the 
presumptions (section 24), endorsements on the Register for Tender Defaulters (sections 28-
33) and the duty to report transactions (section 34) will be evaluated. 
aa) Section 22-23: the competence to investigate ‘unexplained wealth’ 
 
182 See above pp 17 ff. 
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Section 22 of the PCCAA provides for an investigation procedure in terms of Chapter 5 of 
the National Prosecuting Authority Act 32 of 1998, which is normally reserved for use by 
the Scorpions only, in respect of property that may have been used in the commission or for 
the purpose of or in connection with the commission of an offence under the PCCAA or in 
respect of property that may have facilitated the commission of such an offence, or enabled 
any person or entity to commit such offence.183
 
Section 23 of the PCCAA provides for the application by the National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, and the issuing of an investigation direction by a judge in respect of the 
possession of property disproportionate to a person’s present or past known sources of 
income or assets (‘unexplained wealth’). Furthermore, section 23(7) stipulates that any 
person who obstructs or hinders the prosecution or refuses or fails to give any information or 
explanation when required to do so in terms of subsection (4) is guilty of an offence. 
Consequently, section 23(7) might infringe the freedom from self incrimination and the right 
to remain silent. 
 
On the one hand these provisions are a very effective tool to combat corruption, because 
‘unexplained wealth’ is often the only visible trace of corruption. On the other hand one 
must consider that these rather extensive provisions also represent serious intrusions into 
civil rights. Lambrechts even goes so far to call these provisions ‘draconic’, ‘open for 
abuses’ and ‘lending themselves to a witch-hunt, that may well create a situation similar to 
the pre-1994 dispensation where there was a communist behind every bush, or the post-1994 
dispensation where there was a racist behind every bush, ie now there is a corrupter behind 
every bush’.184
 
Nevertheless, at least the competence to investigate appears to be constitutional and justified 
by the difficult and important task to prosecute corrupt activities. The legislature has paid 
due consideration to the requirements of the constitution in this respect, which is, inter alia, 
also indicated by the fact that clause 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Bill originally even 
contained an offence of unexplained wealth, which was at first amended drastically and later 
cancelled completely due to constitutional concerns.185  
 
183 D Lambrechts (note 10) at 112. 
184 D Lambrechts (note 10) at 113. 
185 See Explanatory Memorandum: Prevention of Corruption Bill (note 123) sub 3.21.1; the famous former 
French Prosecutor Eva Joly, who has investigated the spectacular European ‘Elf-scandal’, has made a 
similar proposal to create an offence of ‘illegal enrichment’, which should be completed, if a person’s 
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bb) Section 24: the presumptions 
Section 24(1) of the PCCAA establishes a presumption regarding the link between the 
gratification and the corruptly influenced behaviour as defined by section 24(1)(aa)-(dd), 
which is a repetition of section 3(i)-(iv). Although this link represents the core of the 
criminality of any corrupt activity, it is in absence of a ‘smoking gun’186 indeed often 
difficult to prove.187 Therefore, it would indeed be extremely difficult for the prosecution to 
secure a conviction for corruption under the PCCAA, particularly if dolus directus were 
required for corruption liability under the Act.188
In view of these difficulties, the presumption of section 24(1) basically allows under certain 
conditions the inference from that a gratification was accepted, agreed, demanded 
(subsection (a)) or given, agreed or offered (subsection (a)), that it represented the counter-
performance in respect of certain corrupt behaviour as stipulated by section 24(1)(aa)-(dd).  
 
The application of the presumption firstly requires a material link between the two persons 
as stipulated by subsection (1)(b)(i)-(iii), eg in that the receiver of the gratification was 
serving as an official in a public body from which the giver or his intermediary 
(subsection iii) sought to obtain a contract. Secondly, the State must show that despite 
having taken reasonable steps, it was not able with reasonable certainty to link the 
acceptance of or agreement or offer to accept or the giving or agreement to give or offer to 
give the gratification to any lawful authority or excuse on the part of the person charged, and 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary which raises reasonable doubt, is sufficient 
evidence that the person charged accepted or agreed or offered to accept such gratification 
from that person or gave or agreed or offered to give such gratification to that person in 
order to act, in a manner as stipulated in subsection (aa)-(dd). 
 
The presumption of section 24(1) applies to sections 3-9 and section 21 of the PCCAA and 
is in essence an inference or a presumption of mens rea, including knowledge of 
unlawfulness, which is rebuttable by the accused on adducing evidence sufficient to create a 
reasonable doubt in his or her favour.189 Furthermore, one must consider that section 24(1) 
is likewise a presumption of actus reus, because the link between the gratification and the 
 
standard of living exceeds his official income by more than 1 Mio $, see Eva Joly Im Auge des Zyklons 
(München, 2003) 257. 
186 Carol Paton ‘Presumption joins the Dots’, (2003) 173 Financial Mail at 47. 
187 See above pp 30 ff. 
188 See Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 893. 
189 See Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 894. 
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corruptly influenced behaviour is also contained in the objective, expressively or tacitly 
uttered part of the respective declaration of intention.190  
 
Although section 117(2) of the Firearms Control Act No. 60 of 2000 contains a similar 
presumption and some scholars assume that section 24(1) of the PCCAA will be held 
constitutional by the Constitutional Court, it appears to be at least problematic and on the 
edge of an inadmissible reverse onus. Although it does not technically disturb the burden of 
proof on the State, it exempts the State from proving the link between the gratification and 
the corrupt behaviour, which is the core-element of corruption, and shifts the risk on the 
perpetrator, if the conduct in question cannot be clarified. In addition, this might likewise 
constitute an indirect infringement of the right to remain silent. 
 
In addition to section 24(1), section 24(2) of the PCCAA establishes, in effect, a 
presumption in respect of public officers whose duties include the detection, investigation, 
prosecution and punishment of offenders, which irrebuttably presumes their knowledge of 
unlawfulness regarding acceptance of gratifications in respect of certain violations of their 
professional duties.191 In view of the comprehensive legal knowledge of these professionals, 
this presumption must be welcomed despite its strict liability aspect. 
cc) Section 28-33: the Endorsements on the Register for Tender Defaulters 
In terms of section 28(1) of the PCCAA a court may, in respect of an accused found guilty 
of an offence contemplated in section 12 or 13, in addition to imposing any other sentence, 
issue an order in terms of which the particulars of the convicted person or enterprise must be 
endorsed on the Register, including enterprises, partners, managers and directors involved in 
the commission of the offence. Furthermore, the National Treasury may or must, as the case 
may be, where the Register has been endorsed, pursuant to section 28(3) impose certain 
restrictions in respect of the persons or enterprises so endorsed. These restrictions include 
the termination of an agreement, the determination of a period between 5 and 10 years, for 
which the endorsement must remain on the Register and the disqualification of the offender 
relating to future tenders and contracts. Finally, section 32 stipulates that the Register shall 
be open to the public. 
 
 
190 See above pp 31 ff, 44 f. 
191 See Jonathan Burchell and John Milton (note 2) 894. 
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The Register for Tender Defaulters is a useful preventive tool as it increases the potential 
costs of corruption and thus creates an economic incentive to refrain from corruption, which 
is more effective than the deterrence by the criminal law. Furthermore, it also helps 
affirming the business practices of honest competitors. 
dd) Section 34: the duty to report transactions 
A peculiarity of corruption is that ‘from the first contact between briber and bribee till the 
disguising of the offence everything happens secretly; in comparison to other crimes there 
are no visible traces of violence, no broken doors and no victim that reports the crime to the 
police’.192 As the number of undetected crimes is probably huge, the detection of corrupt 
activities consequently depends to a large extent on hints by ‘insiders’. 
 
Section 34 pays as the ‘most onerous part of the Act’193 due consideration to this fact as it 
imposes a duty to report knowledge or suspicion in respect of the commission of offences as 
stipulated in Part 1, 2, 3, 4 (sections 1-16) or sections 20 or 21 (in so far as they relate to the 
aforementioned offences) of the PCCAA as well as the offence of theft, fraud, extortion, 
forgery or uttering a forged document involving an amount of R100 000 or more on certain 
persons with authority. Pursuant to section 34(4) these persons include the Director-General, 
municipality manager, public officers in the Senior Management Service of a public body, 
any head, rector or principal of a tertiary institution, managers, secretaries or directors of 
companies, executive managers of banks or other financial institutions, partners in a 
partnership, chief executive officers and persons responsible for the overall management and 
control of the business of an employer. According to sections 34(2), 37(2) of the PCCAA 
failure to comply with this duty is a criminal offence since the 31 July of 2004.  
 
Although the establishment of this offence is a very effective tool to combat corruption and 
thus generally deserves approval, there are some details of section 34, which deserve 
critique. Firstly, it seems doubtful to impose a duty to report even in the case that the person 
merely ‘ought to know’ that an offence was committed, because this person does 
consequently not even know his duty to report. In effect, the criminal law then punishes the 
mere negligent failure to realise that an offence was committed.194 Secondly, the restriction 
to the amount of R100 000 is equivocal, because it might either refer to the bribe or to the 
 
192 Eva Joly ‘Es war unglaublich’ Der Spiegel No 14/2002 at 92, 94. 
193 Lisa Swaine (note 124) at 22. 
194 See section 2(2) of the PCCAA. 
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actual damage, which is often hard to assess and can exceed the amount of the gratification 
several times. Furthermore, it is unintelligible why section 34(4) does not include auditors as 
they can play a key-role in detecting corruption in companies. This aspect was discussed 
during the legislation process but then was not considered in the final draft of the Act.195 
Furthermore, one might consider to extend the duty to report to low-profile persons, 
provided that a sufficient protection of these whistleblowers is guaranteed, because low-
profile persons also often have knowledge of corrupt activities, although public policy 
consideration might oppose this idea. 
 
However, some scholars are of the opinion that already the present form of section 34 does 
not provide sufficient protection for whistleblowers against unfair dismissal or 
discrimination and thus might endanger its acceptability in respect of the Constitution. 
Swaine, for instance, emphasises that the PCCAA ‘affords no protection to those subject to 
that duty and, unlike FICA, those holding authority are not indemnified from criminal or 
civil action as a result of their compliance, in good faith, with their reporting obligation, 
which might ultimately hinder its effectiveness’.196 In this respect the review of the 
Protected Disclosure Act No. 26 of 2000 by the Law Commission, which will release its 
report to Parliament before year end, will be of great relevance. 
5. Shortcomings of the PCCAA 
Although the PCCAA is a rather voluminous and detailed piece of legislation, it presents 
various shortcomings. 
a) Lack of an offence relating to violations of ‘cooling-off’ periods 
It is a common phenomenon that public officers start to work for companies in the private 
sector immediately after leaving office, whose business activities are closely related to the 
responsibility of the former public officer. This represents a serious conflict of interest 
comparable to section 17 of the PCCAA, because many public officers possess privileged 
information and in anticipating their exit they might bend government policies to suit their 
own needs. Although the PCCAA fails to establish criminal liability in this respect, the 
Public Service is now considering appropriate regulations after the lack of a ‘cooling-off’ 
period was identified by the Public Service and Administration Committee as an important 
 
195 See statement by Ms Chohan-Khota, Meeting of the Justice and Constitutional Development Portfolio 
Committee on 24 November 2003 (note 123). 
196 Lisa Swaine (note 124) 22 at 23. 
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gap of the Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy.197 Nevertheless, a regulation within the 
PCCAA would have been the preferable solution in view of the factual connection of such 
behaviour to corruption and in view of the intention of the PCCAA to deal with corruption 
comprehensively. 
b) Lack of a specific offence relating to journalists 
As the PCCAA criminalises a great variety of corrupt activities relating to specific persons 
and matters rather detailed, it is astonishing that it completely fails to address corruption 
relating to journalists.198 Although it seems possible to convict journalists in terms of 
section 3, if they, for instance, accept gratifications in order to secretly promote products 
(e.g. cars) in seemingly editorial articles, this seems in view of the vagueness of section 3 
not desirable and a contradiction of the Preamble of the PCCAA, which holds it ‘desirable 
to unbundle the crime of corruption’. 
c) Lack of regulations in respect of civil liability 
Corruption can cause serious harm to the principal of the corruptible agent, honest 
competitors and society on the whole. The principal suffers on the one hand a loss, because 
the bribe is, in effect, paid through a surcharge on the contract value. On the other hand the 
damage caused by the award of contracts to uncompetitive bidders and the often substantial 
inflation of the prices for the briber’s purpose of maximising his profits. Furthermore, honest 
competitors loose their ‘expectancy’ to sell their goods under the conditions of the market 
economy. 
 
In view of these damages it is a shortcoming of the PCCAA that it fails to establish rules in 
respect of the injured parties, particularly as the litigation of such claims provides several 
difficulties. For instance, a civil litigant who claims such losses bears the onus of proof in 
terms of the common law and, furthermore, the common law does not provide a general 
enrichment claim.199 This state of affairs raises complicated questions for a reform of the 
civil law, particularly in respect of presumptions in favour of certain plaintiffs, which cannot 
be dealt with comprehensively within this context. However, the need to address this issue is 
indeed ‘as strong, if not stronger, as the criminal aspect’.200
 
197 See Meeting of the Public Service and Administration Committee on 12 November 2004, available at 
http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=48877 (accessed 15 July 2005). 
198 See regarding factual examples of this form of corruption above p 8. 
199 Statement of Adv Theron, Meeting of the Justice and Constitutional Development Portfolio Committee on 
31 July 2002, http://www.pmg.org.za/viewminute.php?id=1916 (accessed 15 July 2005). 
200 Ibid. 
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V. Conclusion 
A central weak point of the PCCAA is that it fails to consider appropriately that reasonable 
and long-sighted criminal policy needs a clear definition of the nature of corruption and its 
main elements as its yardstick. In this respect it is quite useful to bear in mind that economic 
science comprehends corruption as a special ‘principal-agent conflict’ in the form of an 
illegal exchange of a bribe against a decision of the agent between the latter and an 
‘opponent’ of his principal.201
 
As a result of this failure, for instance, sections 3 and 6 (a)(ii), (b)(i) extend the criminal 
liability partially beyond ‘principal-agent conflicts’, because the bribee can be ‘any person’ 
and thus any incitement given to another person as incitement to commit any offence 
amounts to corruption. For instance, a hitchhiker who persuades the driver of an already 
fully occupied car to give him a lift by offering him to pay a share of the fuel, would be 
liable for corruption in terms of section 3 as he gives a ‘gratification’ to the driver in order 
to make him ‘violate a legal duty’.202  
 
Furthermore, the PCCAA fails to restrict the duties violated by the bribee to such deriving 
from the particular ‘principal-agent-relationship’. Consequently, sections 4 or 6 respectively 
would likewise be fulfilled in the aforementioned example, if the driver were a public officer 
or a private employee regardless that he was acting off-duty and for a completely private 
purpose.203 Finally, the PCCAA extends its liability beyond illegal to mere immoral 
exchanges as the recurring definition of corrupt behaviour of the bribee in section 3(iii) 
includes, inter alia, such that is ‘designed to achieve an unjustified result’. This vague 
definition grants any judge an undue discretion and allows, for instance, convicting the guest 
of a restaurant who gives a tip to the waiter in order to get a certain, already reserved table in 
terms of section 6.204 The PCCAA thus runs the risk of likewise criminalising business 
practices that are ‘crafty’ or ‘rough’ in nature but legal, because terms like ‘unjustified 
result’ or ‘improper’ render the scope of its offences too broad and too amorphous. 
 
The strategy of ‘unbundling’ is a laudable legislative approach, because it generally allows 
on the one hand designing specific offences in accordance with the peculiarities of specific 
 
201 See above p 17. 
202 See above p 41. 
203 See above pp 46, 47. 
204 See above p 39. 
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forms of corruption and on the other hand meeting the constitutional requirements of clarity 
and definiteness to the largest possible extent. In this respect it is a great merit of the 
PCCAA to include corruption wholly within the private sector, which was previously 
underestimated for a long time. However, the concrete realisation of the strategy of 
‘unbundling’ is half-hearted and thwarted by the general definition of corrupt behaviour in 
section 3, which, furthermore, recurs equally within the specific offences besides their 
specific definitions, because intended gaps of the specific offences are closed ‘through the 
back door’.205
 
In view of the general and the specific offences, particularly section 3, 6 and 10, it is further 
unintelligible, why there is any additional need to reinstate the common-law offence of 
bribery as this causes uncertainty whether public officials shall be convicted either for 
violating the common law or the PCCAA.206 Furthermore, a couple of offences overlap with 
each other. For instance, the bribing of employees in order to win contracts fulfils 
section 12, section 6 and section 3. These overlaps negatively impact on the user-
friendliness of the PCCAA, because it will often be unclear which offence should be 
applied, and show that the Act has pushed the generally laudable approach of unbundling’ 
too far.207
 
It is a strong point that the PCCAA criminalises the use of intermediaries by including 
gratifications given ‘directly or indirectly’ and that it likewise punishes gratifications given 
for the benefit of third persons as well as ‘material attempts, ie unilateral, failed offers.208 
However, the Act presents a serious loophole regarding the contacting-phase between the 
briber and the bribee, the so-called ‘feeding’, where gratifications are given without any 
reference to a certain decision solely to test the agent and to build up trust209. While §§ 331, 
333 of the German StGB cover such gratifications relating to public officers,210 section 10 
of the PCCAA requires that the gratification must be given ‘in respect of that party doing 
any act in relation to the exercise, carrying out or performance of that party’s powers, 
duties or functions […]’. As the ‘feeder’ indeed often does not intend to link the 
 
205 See above p 37. 
206 See above p 38. 
207 See above p 38. 
208 See above pp 43, 43. 
209 See above pp 17, 25. 
210 See Appendix, p 68. 
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gratification to any behaviour of the agent at that stage, the practice of ‘feeding’ is not a 
punishable offence under the PCCAA.211
 
Unlike the German StGB, the PCCAA possesses a number of effective, but partially rather 
harsh and problematic additional measures. While the Register for Tender Defaulters 
deserves unreserved approval,212 the presumption of section 24 appears to be at least on the 
edge of an inadmissible reverse onus and might in addition indirectly infringe the right to 
remain silent213. The duty to report corruption involving R100 000 or more, which is 
imposed by section 34 on certain persons with authority is also a very useful tool, because 
the number of undetected crimes is probably huge and hints by ‘insiders’ are the most 
important source of information. However, the acceptability of this duty is problematic as it 
depends to a large extent on effective protection for whistleblowers from unfair dismissal, 
etc.214 Finally, the competence of the NDPP to investigate persons or property, if a person 
possesses disproportionate, ‘unexplained wealth’ and the establishment of a criminal offence 
of obstructing such investigation or refusing to give information is another very effective 
measure, because ‘unexplained wealth’ is often the only trace of corruption.215
 
Shortcomings of the Act are that it fails to rule civil liability for the benefit of the principal 
and honest competitors including a relaxation of proof and lacks to criminalise violations of 
‘cooling-off’-period in respect of public officers as well as corruption relating to journalists 
and auditors.216 However, the currently discussed Public Service Regulations and the new 
Auditors Act might bring some relief in this respect. 
 
On the whole, the PCCAA deserves despite some weak points approval as an effective and 
determined measure to combat the serious threat of corruption, although its awesome extent 
and complicated formulations might impact negatively on its user-friendliness. Furthermore, 
the broad and partial vague extent of the established criminal liability in addition to its rather 
harsh additional tools might weaken the public acceptance of the PCCAA and provide 
perpetrators with the defence that they are victims of a ‘drastic and draconic’217 overreaction 
by the legislature. In this respect less would thus indeed have been more. 
 
211 See above p 51. 
212 See above p 61. 
213 See above p 60. 
214 See above p 62. 
215 See above p 58. 
216 See above pp 63 ff. 
217 See D Lambrechts (note 10) at 117. 
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VI. Appendix: the offences relating to corruption of the German StGB 
The German StGB contains seven offences relating to corruption of voters, members of 
parliament, employees and commissioners of companies and public officers. 
 
 
§ 108b (corruption of voters) 
(1) Any person who offers, promises to give or gives any benefit to another person in order 
to induce him to refrain from voting or from voting in a certain manner will be punished 
with imprisonment up to two years or a fine. 
(2) Any person who demands, accepts to receive or receives a benefit in order to refrain 
from voting or from voting in a certain manner will be punished with imprisonment up to 
two years or a fine. 
 
 
§ 108e (corruption of members of parliament) 
(1) Any person who undertakes to buy or sell a vote in respect of a poll or a voting of the 
European Parliament or any parliament of the German federation or a province will be 
punished with imprisonment up to five years or a fine. 
(2) Apart from convicting a person for a contravention of subsection 1, a court may deprive 
this person of his active and passive voting rights. 
 
 
§ 299 StGB (corruption relating to employees) 
(I) Any employee or commissioner of a company, who demands, accepts to receive or 
receives a benefit for the benefit of himself or a third person as a counter-performance for 
improperly favouring another in respect of the sale or purchase of goods or commercial 
services will be punished with a fine or imprisonment up to five years. 
 
(II) Any person, who offers, promises to give or gives any benefit to an employee or 
commissioner of a company for the benefit of himself or a third person as a counter-
performance for improperly favouring him or another person in respect of the sale or 
purchase of goods or commercial services will be punished with a fine or imprisonment up 
to five years. 
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§ 331 (acceptance of undue benefits by public officers) 
(1) Any public officer who demands, accepts to receive or receives a benefit in respect of his 
official position for the benefit of himself or a third person will be punished with a fine or 
imprisonment up to three years. 
 
(2) Any judge or arbitrator who demands, accepts to receive or receives a benefit for the 
benefit of himself or a third person in respect of the performance or omission of a judicial 
act in the past or in the future will be punished with a fine or imprisonment up to five years. 
Attempt is likewise punishable. 
 
(3) Subsection is not applicable, if the perpetrator has received or accepted to receive a 
benefit, which he has not demanded on his own initiative, if the competent public authority 
has authorised the acceptance of the benefit in advance or following to an immediate report 
by the public officer. 
 
 
§ 332 (corruptibility of public officers) 
(1) Any public officer who demands, accepts to receive or receives a benefit for the benefit 
of himself or a third person as a counter-performance for performing or omitting an official 
act in the past or in the future by violating his official duties will be punished with 
imprisonment from six months up to five years. If mitigating circumstances apply, the 
punishment is imprisonment up to three years or a fine. Attempt is likewise punishable. 
 
(2) Any judge or arbitrator who demands, accepts to receive or receives a benefit for the 
benefit of himself or a third person as a counter-performance for performing or omitting a 
judicial act in the past or in the future by violating his judicial duties will be punished with 
imprisonment from one to ten years. If mitigating circumstances apply, the punishment is 
imprisonment from six months up to five years. Attempt is likewise punishable. 
 
(3) If the perpetrator demands, accepts to receive or receives the benefit in respect of a 
future act or omission, subsections (1) and (2) already apply, if he was willing to  
1. violate his duties, or 
2. consider the benefit in respect of the use of his discretion. 
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§ 333 (granting of undue benefits to public officers) 
(1) Any person who offers, promises to give or gives any benefit to a public officer or to a 
soldier of the federal armed forces for the benefit of himself or a third person in respect of 
his official position will be punished with a fine or imprisonment up to three years. 
 
(2) Any person who offers, promises to give or gives any benefit to a judge or arbitrator for 
the benefit of himself or a third person in respect of the performance or omission of a 
judicial act in the past or in the future will be punished with a fine or imprisonment up to 
five years. Attempt is likewise punishable. 
 
(3) Subsection is not applicable, if the competent public authority has authorised the 




§ 334 (corruption of public officers) 
(1) Any person who offers, promises to give or gives any benefit to a public officer or to a 
soldier of the federal armed forces for the benefit of himself or a third person as a counter-
performance for performing or omitting an official act in the past or in the future by 
violating his official duties will be punished with imprisonment from three months up to five 
years. If mitigating circumstances apply, the punishment is imprisonment up to two years or 
a fine. Attempt is likewise punishable. 
 
(2) Any person who offers, promises to give or gives any benefit to a judge or arbitrator for 
the benefit of himself or a third person as a counter-performance for  
1.  having performed or omitted a judicial act in the past under a violation of his 
judicial duties, or  
2.  performing or omitting a judicial act in the future under a violation of his judicial 
duties. 
 
(3) If the perpetrator offers, promises to give or gives the benefit in respect of a future act or 
omission, subsections (1) and (2) already apply, if he was willing to  
1. violate his duties, or 
2. consider the benefit in respect of the use of his discretion. 
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